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INTRODUCTION 
Reformers recently have attacked the priority accorded the Anglo-
American nonpossessory secured transaction both under bankruptcy1 and 
nonbankruptcy law.2 These reformers believe that the law should reserve 
some of the debtors assets for general creditors,3 most notably tort claimants 
with judgment liens won by highly-paid plaintiffs attorneys. 
In an earlier era, an eminent jurist noted that lawmakers adopt legal 
rules, such as the priority rule, to solve some problem.4 After centuries pass, 
the original problem has vanished, yet the rule remains. So a new generation 
of lawmakers first determines if some new rationale justifies the rule. If so, 
the rule takes on a new life. The implication is that only when this effort fails 
should lawmakers change rules to accommodate the new conditions. Current 
economic justifications for the nonpossessory secured transaction have so far 
proven unhelpful.5 
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; B.A., 
1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E., 1969, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University of Texas at Austin. 
I. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 909 (1996) (a 25% carve out). A secured 
transaction insures that a lender gets repaid. In return for the loan, the lender gets an interest 
in the borrower's personalty. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1997). Secured transactions do not 
include security interests in realty, the subject of mortgages. See U.C.C. § 9-104(j) (1997). 
Secured transactions differ depending on whether the creditor takes possession of the collateral, 
a pledge, or the debtor retains possession of the collateral, a nonpossessory secured transaction. 
See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1997). 
2. See Elizabeth Warren, An Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 323 (1997) (a 20% set aside in U.C.C. § 9-301); see also Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic 
Analysis, 82 CORNEILL. REV. 1483 (1997). 
3. See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1925) (rejecting chattel 
mortgage of accounts even though transaction has no ostensible ownership problem, effectively 
reserving accounts for general creditors). 
4 . OUVER WENDEILHOl.MES,JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). 
5. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's 
Perspective, 16 TEx. L. REV. 595,620 (1998); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note I, at 862-63 n.23 
(providing numerous citations). 
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So before engaging in search of a replacement justification and before 
succumbing to the reformers' siren song to emasculate the non possessory 
secured transaction, an understanding of the original reason for the rule 
granting the nonpossessory secured transaction priority would prove helpful. 
This article aims to provide that understanding. 
Prior legal historians failed to investigate the reasons for the 
development of the nonpossessory secured transaction in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. Instead, they assumed that pre-chattel mortgage act law banned 
the nonpossessory secured transaction as fraudulent.6 As a result these 
historians found certain situations inexplicable. For example, their most 
prominent spokesman, Grant Gilmore, 7 noticed his fraudulent myth could not 
explain the use of different security devices in England and the United States 
during the nineteenth century: 
The hypothesis which has just been outlined does not 
account for the curious fact that the nineteenth century 
development of personal property security was one thing in 
the United States and a quite different thing in England .... 
For an explanation of this divergent development, we must 
await the patient labors of the historians. 8 
The author has recently shown that this fraudulent scenario has no basis 
in the historical record.9 So the current investigation breaks new ground. This 
article endeavors to examine that historical record to determine in what 
situations the parties used the early nonpossessory secured transaction, what 
rules the courts developed to handle the transaction, and which parties 
benefitted from the old rules, which parties desired to ban the transaction, and 
6. See l GRANT GilMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 24 ( 1965); 
Thomas D. Morris, 'Society is not Marked by Punctuality in the Payment of Debts ': The Chattel 
Mortgages of Slaves, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 147, 150 
(University Press of Mississippi, 1984). 
7. Grant Gilmore was a law professor at Yale University, respected legal historian, and 
a draftsman of the article of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with secured transactions. 
For Gilmore's expertise in secured transactions, see DoUGLAS G. BAIRD& 'IHOMAS H. JACKSON, 
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY XXV 
(1987) (calling Gilmore the chief architect of Article 9). Gilmore wrote two books on legal 
history. GRANT GilMORE, 1HE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); GRANT GILMORE, 1HE AGES OF 
AMERICAN LAW (1977); see also MARQUIS WHO'S WHO, INC., WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 154 
(40th ed. 1978). 
8. Gilmore, supra note 6, at 26. 
9. See George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 
(draft of article, on file with author and the Northern Illinois University lAw Review) 
(forthcoming in 29 UNIV. N.MEX. L. REv. (1999)) [hereinafter Flint, Fraudulent Myth]. 
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which parties sought the reform of recording through the chattel mortgage 
acts. 
The Anglo-American nonpossessory secured transaction first appeared 
in the late seventeenth century. 10 The 1677 Statute of Frauds destroyed the 
priority previously accorded the collusive judgment. 11 For a collusive 
judgment, a security device involving a recognizance, statute merchant, or 
statute staple, the secured party obtained the judgment and execution writ 
prior to the lending with the cooperation of the debtor. 12 Collusive judgments, 
covered all the debtor's personalty as well as some realty as of the date of the 
judgment, permitted debtor possession of the collateral, and had enjoyed 
priority as of the date of the execution writ. Many classes of society used 
collusive judgments extensively for a variety of different transactions, both 
commercial and non-commercial. But the 1677 Statute of Frauds, designed 
by landed aristocrats to facilitate the one-time sale of family land and 
treasures to satisfy debts from luxuriant living, provided judgment liens, 
including collusive judgments, with priority against personalty from the time 
the judgment creditor delivered the writ of execution to the sheriff. The 
destruction of the priority previously accorded this competing security interest 
made the nonpossessory secured transaction viable. 
In the eighteenth century the nonpossessory secured transaction 
generally took the form of a sale subject to defeasance or reconveyance 
conditions regarding payment of . the debt: the chattel mortgage, the 
conditional bill of sale, or the deed of trust. 13 The difference between a chattel 
mortgage and a conditional bill of sale involved redemption and the risk of 
loss for the collateral. Under the chattel mortgage the debtor retained 
equitable title for purposes of reacquiring the collateral in equity court, a 
redemption, for a reasonable period after default. A conditional bill of sale 
eliminated this right of redemption; instead, the debtor had a rjght to 
repurchase, the conditions of which the debtor had to satisfy or lose the right 
to repurchase. For a chattel mortgage the risk of loss lay on the debtor, while 
for a conditional bill of sale, on the secured party. The deed of trust 
resembled the chattel mortgage except instead of the secured party obtaining 
title to the collateral a third party, the trustee, received title. Under all three 
10. See id. at 22-24 nn.89-95. 
11. 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 16 (1677) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REAlM 839, 
841 (London, Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1810-28) [hereinafter STAT. OFREAIM]; see also Flint, 
Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 22-24 nn.89-95. 
12. See id. at 17-21 nn.76-87. 
13. See id. at 8-9 nn.33-37. 
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forms the pre-chattel mortgage act nonpossessory secured transaction 
constituted a sale. 
But use of the non possessory secured transaction did not come without 
problems. The form of the transaction, devised in the fifteenth century for 
landed aristocrats, had significant ramifications for buyers and sellers of trade 
goods. He who had title to the collateral, had priority in the collateral. The 
priority for a nonpossessory secured transaction dated from the date of the 
sale, when title passed. So a seller on credit created a nonpossessory secured 
transaction by retaining title, the conditional bill of sale, or taking back title, 
the chattel mortgage. But his buyer, whether a wholesaler or retailer, had no 
title, or at best conditional title, to transfer in a resale. This tension between 
the desires of the first seller for security and of the ultimate buyer not to pay 
twice for the collateral14 would lead to legal conflict during the pre-chattel 
mortgage act era and afterwards. 
Moreover, although nonpossessory secured transactions enlarge the 
available collateral to offer in return for credit, they create a potential for 
debtor fraud not available with the collusive judgment. The nonpossessory 
secured transaction separates the ownership of the collateral, the interest held 
by the creditor, from its possession, held by the debtor. This separation allows 
the debtor to create such successive security interests in the collateral by 
keeping secret the earlier interests. The potential for secret security interests 
led third parties injured by that secrecy to attack the nonpossessory secured 
transaction as fraudulent under the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute. 15 
Under this statute the English courts developed the rebuttable rule, 
designed to benefit the emerging merchant aristocracy, to determine whether 
debtor possession constituted fraud. 16 The rebuttable rule presumed debtor 
possession as fraudulent. The secured party could rebut the presumption by 
showing evidence of a non possessory secured transaction and allow the jury 
to determine its validity. Merchants in the eighteenth century generally 
I4. The purchases were once to the now insolvent debtor on the collateral's purchase 
and again later to the secured party as owner of the collateral. 
I5. Fraudulent Conveyance Act of I57i, 13 Eliz. I, c. 5, § I (Eng.) [hereinafter 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act], reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 11, at 537; 14 Eliz. 
I, c. II,§ I (1572) (Eng.) (reenacting the Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1571), reprinted in 4 
STAT. OF REALM, supra, at 602; 29 Eliz. I, c. 5, § 1 (1587) (Eng.) (perpetualizing the Act), 
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra, at 769; see also Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1585, 27 
Eliz. I, c. 4 (Eng.), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra, at 709 (extending the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act of 157I to purchasers); 39 Eliz. I, c. 18, § 3 (1588) (Eng.), reprinted in4 STAT. 
OF REALM, supra, at 916 (perpetualizing the extension). See generally A.K.R. KIRAll'Y, 
POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGUSH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 550 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, Ltd., 4th ed. 1958). 
16. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 33-38 nn.l40-I62. 
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extended credit with informal documentation. 17 Consequently, they might 
have provided their debtor-buyer a title document in absolute form (without 
the defeasance or reconveyance condition) and require supplementation to 
demonstrate the defeasance or reconveyance condition in light of debtor 
possession. The rebuttable rule allowed this additional evidence to affect 
favorably the outcome. Never-the-less, the rebuttable rule, applied by a jury, 
provided a chance of defeating the non possessory secured transaction by those 
opposed to it. 
The chattel mortgage acts obviated only the secrecy problem. The 
chattel mortgage acts required a public filing for the priority of the 
non possessory secured transaction. The southern American colonies adopted 
them in the eighteenth century, the northern United States adopted them in the 
1830's, and Great Britain adopted one in 1854.18 
This article examines the readily findable pre-chattel mortgage act 
appellate opinions for factual data bearing on the early use of the 
non possessory secured transaction. These decisions range from inception of 
the non possessory secured transaction fostered by the 1677 Statute of Frauds 
to the alteration of the priority rule by the chattel mortgage acts. Since 
southern states did not begin their opinions until after the adoption of their 
respective chattel mortgage acts, this article does not include the southern 
opinions. Similarly, the article only briefly describes the opinions ofEhgland 
as numbering too few and spread over too large a time period to provide · 
accurate indications of use. So the majority of opinions examined come from 
the northern United States. The first three sections treat the northern United 
States. The first section explores the parties involved in the early transactions 
and examines the structure of the early nonpossessory secured transaction. 
Endorsers dominated the secured group. Parties entered nonpossessory 
secured transactions after lending and required supplemental documentation 
to evidence the transaction. The second section plumbs the litigation to 
enforce the early nonpossessory secured transaction and investigates the four 
rules the American courts used when third parties challenged the 
nonpossessory secured transaction. Most actions sought remedies for 
interference by judgment liens. The court's rule fostered this litigation. The 
third section determines the social groups behind a particular rule. Equipment 
manufacturers and institutional lenders, accurate draftsmen, risked loss under 
the rebuttable rule's jury determination. Retailers and buyers opposed the 
nonpossessory secured transaction since it interfered with selling from 
17. 6 SIR WilliAM HOlDSWORTH, A HISTORY OFENGUSH LAW 393 (Methuen & Co. , 
Ltd, 5th ed. 1942, reprinted Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1966). 
18. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 3-4 nn.I0-12. 
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inventory. Wholesalers and jobbers, sloppy draftsmen, favored the status quo. 
The fourth section deals with the English opinions for confirmation of the 
American trends. The English situation differed in that the English 
bankruptcy laws, which did use a fraudulent rule, reduced the problems 
experienced by equipment manufacturers and retailers. As merchants they 
would be subject to the fraudulent rule. English equipment manufacturers 
also had far less political power in England than did their counterparts in 
America. 
I. THE AMERICAN DECISIONS 
The American opinion evidence contained three drawbacks. First, the 
facts behind appellate opinions in the Anglo-American system are bizarre, 
pathological, and atypical. 19 Parties do not litigate over well settled situations 
described in the legal rules. Typical fact patterns result in settlement before 
reaching the appellate court. Parties only fight over questionable cases that 
do not fit the accepted legal rule. So the facts underlying the found opinions 
might not provide a good indication of the era's accepted business practices. 
But the rule in general use did appear from the opinions. The party favored 
by that rule would advocate its application. The other party would advocate 
an exception. The court's rule generally would modify that generally accepted 
rule to fit the bizarre situation. Historians can make inferences as to the era's 
accepted business practices from the rule in general use. 
Second, the facts behind the appellate opinion in the Anglo-American 
system are not readily available, but are severely attenuated.20 The American 
legal systems use an adversary system. Parties only present those facts 
favorable to their position to the trial court. Appellate lawyers further reduce 
these facts by disclosing to the appellate court only those facts important to 
the particular point of the appeal. The appellate judges further sift these facts 
to present only those necessary to support their opinion. Early opinions 
suffered two additional winnowings.21 Trial judges in early American courts 
used procedures designed to strictly narrow the issues involved, to one if 
possible. Also since appellate judges omitted the facts from their reported 
opinions, the early reporters selected from the other appellate court documents 
19. KARL LLEWElLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 62 (1930). 
20. /d. at 35. 
21. WilliAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF 
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY 1760-1830, at 21-22 (1975) (colonial pleadings 
designed to present jury with one issue); id. at 86-87 (colonial pleading not replaced with notice 
pleading until 1830's). 
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the facts they thought relevant to the opinion.22 So the facts available from the 
reported appellate opinions only dimly mirrored the conditions in the 
historical era. But the large number of cases established some factual trends. 
Third, many states did not commence reporting appellate opinions until 
shortly before the passage of the chattel mortgage acts, and some even later. 
Lawyers did not report colonial opinions. Historians cite as causes the 
availability of printed English opinions, regarded as the ultimate authority in 
the colonies, and the absence of a large market to justify the printing cost.23 
Reports of American opinions began at the turn of the nineteenth century 
because of statutes requiring appellate judges to write reasons for their 
opinions or authorizing the appointment of court reporters.24 By then 
American courts needed reports to avoid the confusion caused by forgetting, 
22. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBUSHING 37 ( 1990). 
23. E.g., id. at 24-26. Some colonial lawyers kept notebooks of opinions they deemed 
significant, some of which Alexander Dallas published for Pennsylvania in 1790 covering cases 
from 1754 to 1776 and Josiah Quincy, for Massachusetts in 1865 covering cases from 1761 to 
1772. CHARI.ES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 328 n.l ( 1911 ). The practice 
continued after the American Revolution. Dudley Atkins Tyng reported some for Massachusetts 
in 1808, covering 1786 to 1805,2 Mass. 497; Richard Smith Coxe, for New Jersey in 1816 
covering 1790 to 1793, 1 N.J. Law 1; and Joseph Angell, for Rhode Island in 1847 covering 
1828 to 1841, 1 R.I. xviii, l. Similarly, twentieth century historians have published some New 
York colonial trial reports. These opinions predominantly use the form pleading then common, 
making it difficult to discern the true facts. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, ED., SELECT CASES OF THE 
MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784 (1935). 
24. For written opinion statutes, see 1784 Conn. Laws, p. 268 (May Sess.: Act 
Establishing the Wages of the Superior Court); 1819 Ill. Laws, p. 373,374-75, §§ 7 & 8 (written 
and published); 1816 Ind. Laws, c. 1, § 26, p. 21; 1840 Iowa Terr. Laws, res. 4, p. 54-55 (extra 
session); 1849 Minn. Laws, c. 20, § 8, p. 56 (written and a reporter selected); 1806 Pa. Laws, 
c. 122, § 25, p. 345; 1836 Wis. Terr. Laws, c. 9, § 6, p. 37. Some states reported opinions by 
judicial order, see CHARLES HAMMOND, CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO I 
(Geo. D. Emerson, 1850) (August 1821). Pennsylvania, however, only had unofficial reports 
before 1845. EDWIN C. SURRENCY, RESEARCH IN PENNSYLVANIA LAW 20 (1965) (expressing 
doubt about the completeness of the earliest reported period 1754 to 1806). For reporter 
statutes, see 1820 Me. Laws, c. 17, § 9, p. 18; 1804 Mass. Laws, c. 133, p. 449-50; 1844 Mich. 
Laws, c. 21, § 2, p. 19; 1806 N.J. Laws, c. 115, p. 688-89; 1815 N.H. Laws, c. 46, p. 16 
(repealed Dec. 18, 1816); 1804 N.Y. Laws, c. 68, p. 468; 1845 R.I. Laws, p. 62 (Jan. Sess.); 
1823 Vt. Laws, c. 12, p. 9. Vermont had several private printings prior to 1823 covering narrow 
eras. DANIEL CHIPMAN, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE STATE 
OF VERMONT xiii-xiv (1824); see also WllllAMBRAYTON,REPORTSOFCASES ADJUDGED IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VERMONT (1821) (for cases 1815 to 1819); NATHANIEL 
CHIPMAN, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE STATEOFVERMONT 
IN THE YEARS 1789, 1790,AND 1791 (l793)(forcases 1789 to 1791); ROYAll. TYLER, REPORTS 
OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF 
VERMONT (l809)(for cases 1800 to 1803). For the need for reports, see EPHRAIM KIRBY, 
REPORT OF THE CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT iii 
(1789); CHIPMAN, supra, at 4 (English common law does not apply in all cases, so America 
needs its own common law). 
8 NORTHERN IU/NOIS UNIVERSrrY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.20 
misunderstanding, or erroneously remembering their prior decisions. So 
reported opinions in the northern states started in 1778 for Pennsylvania 
(published in 1790), 1786 for Connecticut (published 1789), 1794 for New 
York (published 1801), 1804 for Massachusetts (published 1805), 1804 for 
New Jersey (published 1808), 1816 for New Hampshire (published 1819), 
1817 for Indiana (published 1830), 1820 for Maine (published 1822), 1820 for 
illinois (published 1831), 1821 for Ohio (published 1833), 1824 for Vermont 
(published 1824), 1839 for Wisconsin (published 1840), 1839 for Iowa 
(published 1849), 1843 for Michigan (published 1846), 184 7 for Rhode Island 
(published 1847), and 1851 for Minnesota (published 1853).25 Minnesota's 
and Rhode Island's reports began after the passage of their respective chattel 
mortgage act. 
These reports contained one hundred forty-seven appellate opinions in 
the northern states dealing with the nonpossessory secured transactions prior 
to the passage of the respective chattel mortgage act.26 To understand why the 
25. For dates of the first reports, see WARREN, supra note 23, at 328-331. For the first 
reports, see NATHANIEL ADAMS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED INTiiE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF JUDICATURE R>R TiiE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (1819); JOSEPH ANGEU., REPORTS 
OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND xviii (J.H. 
Bongartz, 1909-10) (first printed in 1847 in pamphlet form); ISAAC NEWTON BLACKFORD, 
REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE 
STATE OF INDIANA (Bowen-Merrill Co., 3d ed. 1891) (1830); SIDNEY BREESE, REPORTS OF 
CASES AT COMMON LAW AND IN CHANCERY ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Callaghan & Co., 2d ed. 1877) (1831); CHIPMAN, supra note 24 
(including a few cases from 1814 to 1823); WUllAM COLEMAN, CASES OF PRACTICE ADJUDGED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Co., 
1883) (1801); ALEXANDER JAMES DALLAS, REPORTS OF CASES RULED AND ADJUDGED IN THE 
COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA BER>RE AND SINCE THE REVOLUTION (Nicklin & Johnson, 3d ed. 
1830) ( 1790); SAMUEL DoUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME 
COURTOFTHE STATEOFMICHIGAN (1846); JAMES Gll..FILLAN, CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA (1877) (including revised opinions reported with 
statutory recompilations as early as 1853); ARLETTE M. SODERBERG & BARBARA L. GoLDEN, 
MINNESOTA LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 99, 199 (1985); SIMON GREENLEAF, REPORTS OF CASES 
ARGUED AND DECIDED IN TiiE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE (Dresser, 
McCallan & Co., 1876) (1822); HAMMOND, supra note 24 (1833); KIRBY, supra note 23; 
EASTIN MORRIS, REPORTS OF CASES IN LAW AND EQUITY DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF IOWA (T.H. Flood & Co., 1892) (1847); WILLIAM SANDR>RD PENNINGTON, REPORTS OF 
CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN TiiE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW JERSEY (Frederick D. Linn & Co., 1881) (1808); SILAS URIAH PINNEY, REPORTS OF CASES 
ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF WISCONSIN (1872) 
(including opinions reported as early as 1840 as an appendix to the session laws); RICHARD A. 
DANNER, LEGAL RESEARCH IN WISCONSIN 50 (1980); EPHRAIM WllllAMS, REPORTS OF CASES 
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN TiiE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS (Little, Brown & Co., 1866) (1806). 
26. The one hundred forty-seven opinions are distributed amongst the northeastern 
states as follows: Maine, 24; New Hampshire, 2; Vermont, 9; Massachusetts, 35; Rhodels1and, 
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non possessory secured transaction arose in the eighteenth century required an 
identification of those taking advantage of the priority rule for the 
nonpossessory secured transaction and their business practices with the 
nonpossessory secured transaction. This information came from identifying 
the parties involved in the opinions and the situation surrounding their use of 
the nonpossessory secured transaction. This situation involved identification 
of the borrowers, their courthouse opponents, the timing of the non possessory 
secured transaction with respect to the loan, and the documentation for the 
transaction. 
A. THE PARTIES 
The debtors in the early nineteenth century belonged primarily to those 
businesses spurring economic growth in the era. One hundred twelve of the 
one hundred forty-seven opinions (76%) specify the debtor type. Before 1815 
commercial merchants in the international trade dominated the northern 
economy due to the absence of European competition, occupied by the 
Napoleonic Wars. Many commercial merchants owned the ships transferring 
their goods and so spawned the subsidiary shipbuilding industry. Some 
merely transferred their goods on the ships of others. Others formed the 
financial service institutions for their burgeoning trade, the banks and 
insurance companies. After 1818 with the return of European competition, the 
American international trade declined as a percentage of the American 
economy.27 
The opinions reflected the commercial merchants' dominance of the pre-
chattel mortgage act economy. Fifty-two opinions (46%), the largest single 
0; Connecticut, 7; New York, 34; New Jersey to 1840, 2; Pennsylvania to 1840, 18; Ohio, 6; 
Michigan, 1; Indiana, 4; Illinois, 5; Wisconsin, 0; Iowa, 0; and Minnesota, 0. This numbering 
does not include assignments for the benefit of creditors, genuine bottomry or respondentia 
bonds, or pledge opinions. It also excludes opinions dealing with attempted bottomry and 
respondentia bonds that failed the necessity requirements and hence do not constitute an 
authorized ship mortgage. But the numbers do include security given by the ship owner in the 
form of a bottomry or respondentia bond enforceable under the common law, rather than the 
admiralty, and bailment lease opinions. The bailment lease consisted of two agreements: a 
lease for a term with rental payments approximating the purchase price and a future sale or 
option to purchase for a nominal additional payment. Pennsylvanians used it to sell an object 
on credit. See James A. Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailment Lease, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 920, 
921 (1931); 1 Grant Gilmore, supra note 6, at 77-78 (developed in 1831 after the conditional 
bill of sale failed as a security device for Pennsylvania in 1825); see also Myers v. Harvey, 39 
Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831) (recognizing the bailment lease); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 
Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (rejecting the conditional bill of sale as security). 
27. DoUGlAS NORTH, THE EcONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1860, at 
36-42, 47 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1966); GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION 
REVOLUTION 1815-1860, at 10-11 (Harper & Row, Pub., 1951). 
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grouping, dealt with loans to them as shipowners and traders. Most of the 
twenty-three opinions before 1820, sixteen, involved shipowners while one 
involved a trader.28 After 1820, shipowners continued to borrow, appearing 
in fifteen additional opinions.29 Twenty more opinions concerned traders and 
their firms.30 
28. For early shipowners, see Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 
11,096) (sloop operator); Hurry v. The John and Alice, 12 F. Cas. 1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 
6,923), on retrial, Hurry v. Hurry's Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922) 
(brig owner); Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 (Adm. Ct. Pa. 1786) (No. 4,925) (brig 
owner); Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (shipowner); Clark v. Richards, 1 Conn. 53 (1814) 
(owner of sloop); Tucker v. Buffington, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819) (two failed 
shipowners); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811) (insolvent co-shipowner); Portland 
Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 423 (1810) (ship owning firm); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 
Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (l808)(two shipowners); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808) 
(two shipowners); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819) (shipowner); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 
Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (co-shipowner and merchant firm); M'Intyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 
159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (shipowner); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1810) (vessel buyer); Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa. , 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811) (schooner 
owner); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 3 (1791) (ship operator and owner). 
Shipowners used sloops for the coastal trade, two-masted brigs in the Latin American trade, and 
three-masted ships in the Atlantic trade. See George Rogers Taylor, supra note 27, at 107. For 
the trader, see Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) (Philadelphia merchant). 
29. See The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9,187) (owner of sloop); 
Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me. 132 (1841) (brig owner); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832) (boat 
buyer); Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Me. 474 (1830) (master and vessel owner); Thorndike v. Stone, 28 
Mass. (11 Pick.) 183 (183l)(freight operator); Peters v. Ballister, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826) 
(insolvent Portland shipowner); Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. (2 
Pick.) 249 (1824) (shipowner); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 388 (1823) (North 
Carolina ship owning firm); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 288 (1823) (shipowner); 
Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822) (shipowner); Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 
212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)(sloop seller); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (sloop 
operator); Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Hall 121 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship owner); Ring v. 
Franklin, 2 Halll (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship owner); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1826) (sloop buyer). 
30. See D'Wolfv. Harris, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830)(Rhode Island merchant); Conard 
v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828)(Philadelphia merchant); Franklin Ins. Co. v. 
Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5,057) (Boston merchant); United States v. 
Delaware Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 8ll (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942) (Philadelphia merchant); 
Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) (firm); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. 59 (1827) (merchant in 
mercantile firm); Witwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. 452 (1825) (gin jobber); Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. 
206 (1824) (wine jobber); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821) (navy contractor for 
lumber); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (Boston consignee); New England 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16Tyng) 275 (1820) (shareholder of bank and insurance 
companies); Rogers v. Traders Ins. Co., 6 PaigeCh. 581 (N.Y. Ch. 1837) (Mobile traders); Levy 
v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (New Orleans trading partnership); Lewis v. 
Stevenson, 2 Hall63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (New York City merchant); Stutson v. Brown, 7 
Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (member of firm); Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1821) (member ofinsolvent trading firm); Collins v. Meyer, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) (merchant 
partner); Delaware Ins. Co. v. Archer, 35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832) (Philadelphia merchant); 
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The manufacturing industries began on a large scale when Jefferson's 
1807 embargo forced some commercial merchants in the international trade 
to shift their moneys to manufacturing embargoed goods in order to reduce 
risks?1 After 1815, these businesses and their competitors, especially the tex-
tile industries, began to require funds. Since commercial merchants, the one 
group at the time with investable money,32 funded these emergent manu-
factures, as well as established manufacturers, they would use the same 
lending practices employed in their shipping business. Again, the opinions 
mirrored this need and practice. Twenty-nine opinions (26% ), the second 
largest grouping, dealt with manufacturing businesses. Most of these opin-
ions, sixteen, treated emergent manufacturing businesses, prominent only after 
1807 and requiring mechanical power, fourteen dealt with textiles both cotton 
and woolen and two unspecified, but requiring steam engines.33 Thirteen 
opinions involved established manufacturing, prominent in the colonial era but 
only on a small scale, three dealt with bricks, three with leather, two with 
spirits, two with printing, one with shipbuilding, one with lumber, and one 
Insurance Co. ofPa. v. Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822) (Philadelphia merchant); 
Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822) (Philadelphia merchant). 
31. For commercial merchant funding of manufacturing, see NORTH, supra note 27, at 
56, 159; PETERJ.COI.EMAN, THETRANsroRMATIONOFRHODEISLAND 1790-186071-77 (1963); 
ROBERT DALZElL, ENTERPRISING EurE: THE BOSTON ASSOCIATES AND THE WORlD THEY 
MADE 4 (1987); BARBARA M. TuCKER, SAMUEL SLATER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
TEXTilE INDUSTRY: 1790-1860 34 (1984) (in England); id. at 47-63 (tracing the origin of 
factory culture to Rhode Island merchant practices). But see PHIUP SCRANTON, PROPRIETARY 
CAPITAUSM: THE TEXTilE MANUFACTURERS AT PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1885 36-41 (1984) 
(describing the alternative of alien skilled workers as sole proprietorships eventually owning 
mills). 
32. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POUTICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 
THE CIVIL WAR 56 (1957) (noting that Pennsylvania bank merchants lent only to themselves); 
id. at 66 (Massachusetts merchants incorporated Massachusetts banks); id. at 72 (banks set up 
for merchants only). 
33. For the textiles, see Wilbur v. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1850) (cotton textile 
factory operator); Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (cotton textile factory owner); Brinley 
v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (cotton and iron manufacturing company); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 
96 (1827) (carding machine operator); Haskell v. Greely, 3 Me. 425 (1825) (partner in lease of 
carding machine); Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) (woolen textile factory 
owning partnership); Carrington v. Smith, 25 Mass. (9 Pick.) 419 (1829) (textile factory 
operator); Flagg v. Dryden, 24 Mass. (8 Pick.) 52 (1828) (textile factory operator); Ayer v. 
Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 (1827) (cotton textile factory buyer); Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. 
(2 Pick.) 607 (1824) (textile factory owner); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) 
(woolen manufactory operator); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) (wool carding 
factory buyer); Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433 (1839) (woolen manufacturing company); Tobias 
v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830) (woolen textile factory operator). For steam engines, see Langdon 
v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (buyerofsteamengine); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 
(Guernsey County Ct. 1832) (steam engine operator). 
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addressed construction.34 Moreover, the bulk of the manufacturing cases 
occurred after 1823, except one each in 1815, 1817, and 1819. 
The northern economy included two other groups of less substantial 
means; the farmers and townspeople.35 The smaller borrowing needs of these 
less substantial groups did not involve nonpossessory secured transactions 
until late in the pre-chattel mortgage act era. Commercial merchants did not 
lend to the common man until the political strength of the less wealthy forced 
the formation of banks to fund their activities. 36 Sixteen opinions ( 14%) dealt 
with farmers, none before 1826.37 Twelve opinions (11 %) concerned the 
townspeople, namely, seven retailers, three transporters, and two pro-
fessionals, none before 1819.38 
34. See Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (Hartford printer and bookbinder); 
Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 86 (1842) (ship builder); Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) 
(newspaper publisher); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (13 Pick.) 497 (1833) (brick maker); 
Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) (brick factory owner); Reed v. Upton, 27 
Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 (1830) (brick maker); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (ll Tyng) 300 (1815) 
(deceased insolvent saw mill operator); Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) 
(church builder); McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (brewer); Reynolds 
v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (distillery operator); Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 44 Pa. 
(4 Watts) 121 (1838) (tanner); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1826) 
(tannery operator); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) (tannery operator). 
35. See JONATHAN HUGHES, AMERICAN EcONOMIC HISTORY 30, 32-34 (3d ed. 1990); 
TUCKER, supra note 31, at 24-26 (merchants, artisans, and unskilled farm workers). 
36. See HAMMOND, supra note 32, at 116 (Hamilton's banks served only merchants, 
not farmers); id. at 119 (agrarians oppose U.S. bank); id. at 145-47 (Republicans came to power 
to break Federalist commercial bank monopoly, made banks ancillary to agriculture and industry 
by lending to farmers and mechanics). 
37. See Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (farm owner); Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 
(1838) (buyer of oxen); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (buyer of oxen); Smith v. Tilton, 
I 0 Me. 350 (1833) (buyer of oxen); Lunt v. Whitaker, 10 Me. 310 (1833) (farmer); Fletcher v. 
Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 ( 1833) (farmer); Adams v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. ( 10 Pick.) 199 
(1830) (farmer); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827) (tenant farmer); Ash v. 
Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831) (buyer of oxen); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847) (buyer of 
wagon and oxen); Middlesworth v. Robinson, Wright 552 (Ohio 1834)(farmer); Myers v. 
Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831) (farmer); Welsh v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (l Pen. & W.) 57 
( 1829) (farmer); Durkee v. Leland, 4 Vt. 612 (1832) (maple sugar farmer); Spaulding v. Austin, 
2 Vt. 555 (1830) (sheep herder); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826) (farmer). 
38. For retailers, see Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (store operator); Shumway v. 
Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (tavern operator); Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. 519 (Mich. 
1845) (tavern operator); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820) (insolvent store operator); 
Divverv. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (grocery operator); Bisset v. Hopkins, 
3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (tavern operator); Weller v. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1819) (tobacconist). For transporters, see Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 
(1832) (stable operator); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 (1846) (steamboat operator); Martin 
v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (wagoner). For professionals, see Doane v. 
Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (traveling preacher); Clark v. Jack, 47 Pa. (7 Watts) 
375 (1838) (law partnership). 
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These two groups also appeared later since some states provided 
exemptions from levy for livelihood necessities.39 Lenders would not lend to 
nonsubstantial individuals on the basis of unleviable assets. And these two 
groups had few other assets until late in the pre-chattel mortgage act era. 
Lenders of the era insured repayment by lending on reputation or leviable 
collateral, a lesson carried over from the collusive judgment.40 
Three homeowners, one in 1810, could belong to any group.4 1 
Examination of the collateral, described in one hundred and thirty-nine 
opinions (95%), revealed the same. Forty-eight opinions (35%), the largest 
grouping, involved the commercial merchant trade.42 Forty dealt with ships 
39. See, e.g., Conn. Rev. Stat., tit. 2, § 74 (1821) (necessary apparel, bedding, 
household furniture, arms, implements of trade, one cow, ten sheep, two swine, two cords of 
wood, limited meat, potatoes, and wool, and one stove); 1821 Me. Laws 95 (wearing apparel, 
beds and bedding, household utensils, tools of trade, school books, one cow, one swine, and ten 
sheep); 1805 Mass. Acts 100 (wearing apparel, beds, bedsteads, bedding, and necessary 
household utensils, necessary tools of trade, Bibles, school books in use, one cow and one 
swine); 1807 N.H. Laws, p. 19 (wearing apparel, one bed, bedstead and bedding, Bible and 
school books in use, one cow, and one swine, and tools of trade up to $20); 1851 N.J. Laws, p. 
278 (household goods and tradesmen's tools up to $200); 1815 N.Y. Laws 227 (sheep, one cow, 
two swine, wearing apparel, bedding, cooking utensils, one table, six chairs, and eating 
utensils); 1828 Pa. Laws, No. 128 (limited household utensils and implements of trade, wearing 
apparel, two beds and bedding, on(: cow, two hogs, six sheep, one stove, limited meat, potatoes, 
grain, and flax); 1820 R.I. Laws, p. 18, 22 (June Insolvency Act: furniture, bedding, implements 
oftrade and husbandry, not exceeding $150); 1797 Verm. Laws, p. 19, 29 (section 12: necessary 
apparel and bedding). 
40. For collateral lending, compare lAMES GRANT, MONEY OFTHE MIND: BORROWING 
AND LENDING IN AMERICA fROM THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAELMILKEN 77-79 ( 1992)(1ending on 
the basis of collateral values in 1870s), with id. at 14-15, 384 (lending on basis of cash flows 
even with negative equity in the 1980s). 
41. See Ripley v. Dolbie, 18 Me. 382 (1841) (buyer of horse); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 
Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (town tenant); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837) (buyer 
of horse). 
42. For ships and cargos, see Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830)(ship, brigs 
with furniture and cargo); Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 386 (1826)(Canton tea 
on ship); Franklin Ins. Co. v. Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5,057) (specie); 
United States v. Delaware Ins. Co. , 25 F. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942) (specie); 
Hurry v. The John and Alice, 12 F. Cas. 1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 6,923), on retrial, Hurry 
v. Hurry's Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922) (ship); Philips v. Ledley, 
19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096) (sloop); Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 
(Adm. Ct. D. Pa. 1786) (No. 4,925) (brig); The Mary, 16F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 
9,187) (sloop with tackle, apparel and furniture); Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (brig); 
Clark v. Richards, I Conn. 53 (1814) (sloop); Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 86 (1842) (vessel); 
Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me. 132 ( 1841) (brig); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832)(boat); Colson 
v. Bonzey, 6 Me. 474 (1830) (vessel); Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (schooner); 
Thorndike v. Stone, 28 Mass. (II Pick.) 183 (1831) (ship); Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824) (brig); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 389 
(1823) (brig); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 288 (1823) (vessel); Tucker v. 
Buffington, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819) (ship, sloop); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 
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and their cargos, such as Canton tea, South Carolina cotton and rice, and 
Liverpool salt. Eight concerned traders, their shares of stock, and their goods, 
including candles, Canton tea, Florida live oak, rum, and gin. Thirty opinions 
(22%), the second largest grouping, related to manufacturing collateral.43 
286 (1811) (sloop); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 (1810) (ship and profits of 
Liverpool salt); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808) (schooner and cargo of 
South Carolina cotton and rice); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819)(sloop); Murray v. Burtis, 15 
Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (sloop); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) 
(sloop); Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Halll21 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship); Ring v. Franklin, 2 Hall 
l (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship); Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (sloop); 
Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (sloop); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 
283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (ships and cargos from Batavia); M' lntyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1811) (brig); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. l810)(vessel); 
Delaware Ins. Co. v. Archer, 35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832) (dry goods); Insurance Co. ofPa. v. 
Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822) (merchandise); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. 
& Rawle) 118 (1822) (ship); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) (tobacco and sugar); 
Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811) (schooner); Morgan' s Executors 
v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (l Yeates) 3 (1791) (ship and brig). For merchant goods, see Whitwell v. 
Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827) (hogshead of gin); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 
Tyng) 606 (1822) (rum); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821) (Florida live oak); 
Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (Canton tea); New England Marine Co. v. 
Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820) (shares of insurance company and bank); Hussey v. 
Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808) (boxes of candles); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 
(N.Y. Ch. 1835) (trading goods); Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall 63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) 
(counting-house and household furniture). 
43. For the factory of the emergent manufacturer, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 
(1831) (land, factory, and cotton textile machinery); Carrington v. Smith, 25 Mass. (9 Pick.) 419 
(1829) (factory and spinning mule); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 (1827) (factory and 
cotton textile machinery); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) (land, factory, and 
carding machines); Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433 (1839) (factory and woolen textile machinery). 
For the equipment of the emergent manufacturer, see Wilbur v. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 
(1851) (spindle machinery); Hankins v. Ingols, 4 Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1835) (carding machine); 
Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) (carding machine); Haskell v. Greely, 3 Me. 425 (1825) 
(carding machine); Flagg v. Dryden, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 52 (1828) (looms); Homes v. Crane, 19 
Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 (1824) (carding machines); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1832) (steam engine); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) (steam engine); 
Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830) (carding machine). For inventory of the emergent 
manufacturer, see Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) (flannel in factory); Barrett 
v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (woolen goods in factory). For the factory ofthe 
established manufacturer, see Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833) (kilns of 
brick); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) (arches of brick). For equipment 
of the established manufacturer, see Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (printing apparatus); 
Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 1835) (blacksmith bellows and tools); Smith v. Putney, 
18 Me. 87 (1841) (printing press); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 (1830) (brick 
pressing machine); McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (brewery utensils 
and beer, malt, hops, barrels, and furniture); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1826) (copper still, steam tubs, and coolers); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1824) (blacksmith tools, livestock, crops, and furniture). For inventory of the established 
manufacturer, see Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 300 (1815) (logs in river); Elder v. 
Rouse, 15 Wend. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (builder's rights in church pews); Jenkins v. 
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Sixteen of these opinions treated collateral of the emergent manufacturers, 
namely their factory buildings, equipment (such as textile machinery) and 
inventory (such as wool and flannel). Fourteen referred to the collateral of the 
established manufacturers, namely their buildings, equipment (such as brick 
machinery) printing presses and blacksmith's tools, and inventory such as 
logs, bricks, and pews. 
The third largest grouping for the collateral, thirty opinions (22%), 
pertained to farming collateral, such as hay, com, wheat, rye, horses, cattle, 
sheep, hogs, maple sugar equipment, ploughs and wagons.44 The fourth 
largest grouping, sixteen opinions ( 11% ), treated collateral of townspeople. 45 
Nine opinions tied-in with retail merchants, such as general stores, a dry goods 
Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (hides); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 Serg. & 
Rawle) 198 (1824) (hides and household furniture); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 
275 (1819) (hides and tools). 
44. For farm produce, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (produce and farm); 
Adams v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 199 (1830) (hay, horse, and cart); Butterfield v. Baker, 
22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827) (produce, com); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 
(1831) (grain in ground, plough, wagon, and horse); Welsh v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (1 Pen. & W.) 57 
(1829) (wheat and rye in ground). For livestock, see Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. 296 (1836) 
(livestock); Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833) (colt, steer, cow, mare); Ripley v. 
Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841) (stud horse); Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838) (oxen); Tibbetts 
v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (oxen); Smith v. Tilton, 10 Me. 350 (1833) (oxen); Lunt v. 
Whitaker, 10 Me. 310 (1833) (livestock); Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 (1832) 
(mare and cow); Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831) (oxen); Randal v. Cook, 17 Wend. 53 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1837)(horses); Patchin v. Pierce,l2 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834)(maresand cattle); 
Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (oxen); Ferguson v. Lee, 
9 Wend. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (cow, hogs, and household furniture); Middlesworth v. 
Robinson, Wright 552 (Ohio 1834) (hog); Atwater v. Mower, 10 Vt. 75 (1838) (cow); 
Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1830) (sheep, cows, and chaise and harness); Fletcher v. 
Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826) (hog). For farm equipment, see Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 
455 (1846) (wagon and horses); Morris v. Grover, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 528 (1840) (wagon, harness, 
and horse); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832) (chaise); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 
464 (1833) (farming utensils and cattle); Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) 
(chaise and harness); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847) (wagon, yoke, and oxen); 
Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837) (wagon, sled, harnesses, and horses); Durkee v. Leland, 
4 Vt. 612 (1832) (sap buckets, cauldron kettle, and sap holder). 
45. For retail merchants, see Abbott v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408 (1841) (stock of store, 
now lime); Cutter v. Copeland, 18 Me. 127 (1841) (board logs); Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 
(1826) (stock in trade); Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 206 (1824) (wine and vinegar); 
Jackson v. Dean, I Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845) (tavern furniture, carriage, wagon, harness, and 
horse); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) (stock of dry goods); Hall v. Snowhill, 14 N.J.L. 
8 (1833) (calico); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (contents of retail 
grocery); Wellerv. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)(merchandiseand household 
furniture). For transporters, see Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 (1832)(stable horse); 
Rogers v. Traders Ins. Co., 6 Paige Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1837) (steamboat); Bailey v. Burton, 8 
Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831) (coaches, harness, and horses); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 (1846) 
(steamboat); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (wagoner's horse and 
wagon). 
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store and a grocery store. Five had to do with transportation, three livery 
operators and two steam boaters. Two dealt with professionals, a minister and 
a lawyer.46 Those fifteen opinions (10%) dealing with a single horse and 
household furniture could belong to any group.47 
These debtors reflected the groups in society needing to borrow money. 
These businesses, predominantly the commercial merchants followed by the 
manufacturers, would grant whatever rights reasonably needed to foster the 
borrowing, including nonpossessory secured transactions. 
Opinions identifying those demanding security numbered less, eighty-
nine opinions (61 %). Those groups, allied with the commercial merchants, 
dominated. In the early nineteenth century American banks, composed of 
commercial merchants for the purpose of lending to other commercial 
merchants, generally lent, not on the basis of collateral, but on the basis of 
guarantees, usually from commercial merchant members or their substantial 
friends.48 Similarly, inventory sellers extended credit through accepting bills 
of exchange, sometimes guaranteed by substantial merchants known to the 
seller.49 Guarantors previously had not used collusive judgments for these 
guarantee transactions but instead had become co-debtors.50 Thus, 
46. See Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)(travelingpreacher's mare 
and goods); Clark v. Jack, 47 Pa. (7 Watts) 375 (1838) (law library). 
47. For single horses, see Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832) (horse); Lane v. Borland, 
14 Me. 77 (1836)(horse); Look v. Comstock,15 Wend. 244(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)(horse); Case 
v. Boughton,11 Wend. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (horse); Brown v. Bement, 8 Johns. 96 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1811) (horse and chair); Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 430 (1836) (mare). For household 
furniture, see Ingraham v. Martin, 15 Me. 48 (1838) (household furniture); Holbrook v. Baker, 
5 Me. 309 (1828) (clock); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (household 
furniture); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) (household furniture); Hendricks v. 
Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820) (household furniture); Gardnerv. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1834) (bureau); Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (plate and furniture); 
Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (household furniture); Gifford v. Ford, 5 
Vt. 532 (1833) (household goods). 
48. See HAMMOND, supra note 32, at 56 (bank merchants of first banks lent to selves); 
see also Harold Livesay & Glenn Porter, The Financial Role of Merchants in the Development 
of U.S. Manufacturing 1815-1860,9 EXPLORATIONSINEcON. HIST. 63,65-67 (1971) (banks 
lent only on strong collateral, usually government bonds or real estate mortgages; whereas banks 
would lend to wealthy merchants on their signatures). 
49. For seventeenth century England, see ROBERT AsHTON, THE CROWN AND MONEY 
MARKET 1603-1640 6-7 (1960) (sureties as guarantors on bonds and bills obligatory). For 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see FRrrz REDUCH, THE MOlDING OF AMERICAN 
BANKING:MENANDIDEAS--PARTI 1781-1840 10-12 (1951) (in 1790s 1entonlyon double-name 
paper, a practice that led to accommodation paper in the country banks). 
50. See ANGELA CONYERS, WILTSHIRE EXTENTS FOR DEBTS: EDWARD 1--EUZABETH I 
10 (1973) (holders of collusive judgments proceeded against sureties as debtors; many collusive 
judgments had three or four co-debtors, often family members). Guarantors became liable only 
when the debtor had insufficient assets, in which event a subsequent claim on the collateral 
behind the collusive judgment would do the guarantor little good. See id. 
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guaranteeing after the collusive judgment era acquired a new aspect, namely 
an attempt to recoup on some of the collateral before total collapse by the 
debtor by the time of execution. Commercial merchants also comprised some 
of the first manufacturers in Eastern New England. 51 Consequently, the vast 
majority of secured parties constituted the note endorsers, ultimately for bank 
and supplier loans, and the commercial merchants, their partners and 
manufacturers for direct loans, as well as an occasional bank or insurance 
company, totaling fifty-three opinions (60%).52 
51. See id. at 69 (as controlling shareholders or partners); COLEMAN, supra note 31, at 
77-83 (the merchant families of Brown in Providence, D'Wolf in Bristol, and Hazard in 
Newport as partners); DAIZEU., supra note 31, at vii, 7 (the merchant families of Lowell in 
Newburyport and the Lawrences, Cabots, and others in Boston as shareholders). 
52. For the twenty-one note endorsers, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) 
(endorser for New London Bank); Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (endorser); Haskell v. 
Greely, 3 Me. 425 (1825) (endorser for Bangor Bank); Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 
(1832) (surety); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) (endorser); Gordon v. 
Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824) (endorser); Badlam v. 
Tucker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823) (Wilmington partnership endorser); Jewett v. Warren, 
12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 300 (1815) (endorser for Kennebec Bank); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 
Tyng) 286 (1811) (co-shipowner endorser); Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) 
(surety); Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) (surety); Ferguson v. Union 
Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (purchase money endorser); Bailey v. Burton, 
8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831) (surety); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) 
(surety for rent); Wellerv. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)(endorser for Middle 
District Branch Bank); M'Intyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (accommodation 
party); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847) (surety); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 Serg. 
& Rawle) 198 (1824) (endorser); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) 
(accommodation party for Bank of Pittsburgh); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) 
(endorser friend); Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1830) (surety). For the fifteen merchants, five 
partners, and three manufacturers, see D'Wolfv. Harris, 29 U.S . (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (New York 
City merchant); Hurry v. The John and Alice, 12 F. Cas. 1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 6,923), 
on retrial, Hurry v. Hurry's Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922) 
(Liverpool merchant); Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 (Adm. Ct. Pa. 1786) (No. 4,925) 
(Dublin merchant); Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) (printing partner); Macomber v. Parker, 
31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833) (lessee of debtor's brickyard); Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 
Pick.) 216 (1832) (assignees of debtor' s former partner); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 
Pick.) 213 (1832)(owner of debtor's brickyard); Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 
(1827) (auctioneers); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826) (Boston merchant co.); 
Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822)(store-owner seller of rum); Rice v. Austin, 
17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (182l)(merchant); Lanfearv. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) 
(English merchant house); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808) (mercantile 
partnership); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (debtor's factory); Look v. 
Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (ex-partner); Ring v. Franklin, 2 Hall I (N.Y. 
Super. Ct. 1829) (merchant firm); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) 
(two co-shipowners); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) (merchant partner); Rogers v. Dare, 
Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) (manufacturer of steam engine); Jenkins v. 
Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (Baltimore merchant); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 
Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822) (Philadelphia merchant); Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. 
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The next largest group embodied the sellers and their lenders with 
twenty-six opinions (29%).53 Of these, twelve sellers, all but one an 
equipment seller, and all four financiers possessed substantial means as 
commercial merchants or as manufacturers and their lenders. The remaining 
secured parties consisted of the less substantial (11% of the opinions), four 
landlords, four relatives, and two sheriffs. 54 
(4 Binn.) 244 (1811) (St. Thomas merchant); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 
3 (1791) (co-shipowner). For the four banks and five insurance companies, see Conard v. 
Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828)(insurance company); Franklin Ins. Co. v. Lord, 
9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5,057) (insurance company); United States v. Delaware 
Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 811, (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942) (insurance company); Brinley v. 
Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (trustee for banks); New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 
Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820) (bank); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 (1810) 
(bank); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808) (bank); Delaware Ins. Co. v. 
Archer, 35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832) (insurance company); Insurance Co. ofPa. v. Duval, 23 
Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822) (insurance company). Banks did not appear in many cases 
since the standard method of transferring security interests to banks involved a trustee, usually 
a bank officer, who took in trust for the bank corporation. See New England Marine, 16 Mass. 
at 277. 
53. For the fourteen merchant and manufacturer sellers, see Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. 
Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096) (sloop seller); Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) 
(printing apparatus seller); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832) (boat seller); Thorndike v. Stone, 
28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 183 (1831) (ship seller); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 (1830) 
(seller of brick machinery); Flagg v. Dryden, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 52 (1828) (broker-seller of 
loom); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 (1827) (seller of Andover textile factory); Barrett 
v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824)(wool seller); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 
(1817) (woolen factory seller); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (steam 
engine seller); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (firm ship seller); Wendover 
v. Hogeboom, 8 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (vessel seller); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 
72 (1846) (seller of steamboat); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830) (woolen factory seller). For 
the eight less substantial sellers, see Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841) (horse seller); Pickard 
v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838) (oxen seller); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) (horse seller); 
Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (oxen seller); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 
(1831) (horse and wagon seller); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) 
(horse seller); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837) (horse seller); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 
115 (Vt. 1826) (seller of farm tools). For the four purchase moneylenders, see Wilbur v. AI my, 
53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (185l)(textile machinery purchase financier); The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 
(C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9,187) (sloop purchase financier); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) 
(refinancier of textile machinery purchase); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) 
(financier of sloop purchase). 
54. For the landlords taking security interests for rents, see Butterfield v. Baker, 22 
Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827); Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 
Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). For the 
relatives, seeTobyv. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (debtor's father); Fletcherv. Willard, 31 Mass. 
(14 Pick.) 464 (1833) (debtor's brother); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) 
(debtor's brother); Ludlowv. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (debtor's father-in-law). 
For the sheriffs, see Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832) (deputy sheriff); Atwater v. Mower, 10 
Vt. 75 (1838) (constable). 
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These secured parties mirrored the groups in society with sufficient 
wealth to serve as guarantors, namely the merchants, and those selling on 
credit, predominantly merchants and manufacturers. They carefully sought 
some protection in extending credit. The appearance of relatives suggests that 
parties used the nonpossessory secured transaction to grant a preference. 55 
Identification of those willing to remain general creditors involved 
difficulty. To obtain rights to the collateral, general creditors generally had 
to obtain a judgment and a court order commanding the sheriff to levy against 
the collateral. The 1677 Statute of Frauds provided the priority date for the 
judgment as the date of delivery of the writ of execution to the sheriff for 
execution.56 Consequently, since the sheriff or his representative held the 
collateral, he appeared as the defendant in most cases. But forty-eight 
opinions (33%) did reveal the identity of the general creditor. Those groups 
remaining general creditors resembled the groups demanding secured credit. 
The commercial merchants again dominated with seventeen opinions (35% ). 57 
These commercial merchants did not relate on a friendly basis with the debtor 
as did the secured parties. So they had to use the courthouse to obtain an 
interest in the collateral. 
The main difference between this group and the corresponding secured 
party group lay with the very few endorsers, only two opinions. Those 
guaranteeing the debtor's debt had befriended him enough to also obtain 
security when needed. 
55. Courts honored preferences outside of bankruptcy, even if insolvent. See, e.g., 
Cook v. Swan, 5 Conn. 140 (1823)(mortgage); Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826)(bill of sale 
for trade stock); Widgery v. Haskell, 5 Mass. (4 Tyng) 144 (1809) (rule does not apply to an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors: bill of sale of ship to secure); Hendricks v. Robinson, 
2Iohns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)(assignment of ships to secure); Lindle v. Neville, 28 Pa. (13 
Serg. & Rawle) 227 (1825) (mortgage). 
56. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
57. SeeThe Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824)(No. 9,187) (supplier of cargo 
in Nassau, New Providence); Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (New York City trading 
partnership); Clark v. Richards, 1 Conn. 53 (1814) (Philadelphia shipper); Sumner v. Hamlet, 
29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) (mercantile partnership); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass·. (1 Pick.) 
389 (1823) (Boston mercantile firm); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) 
(Boston merchant co.); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 (1810) (English 
partnership of shippers); Rogers v. Traders Ins. Co., 6 Paige Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1837) (New 
York City merchants); Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (firm); Thorn v. 
Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (shipper); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) 
(merchant firm); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) (former partner, 
exporter). For commercial merchants as insurance companies and endorsers, see Whitwell v. 
Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827) (endorser); Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824); New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 
Tyng) 275 (1820); Jennings v.lnsurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811); Fletcher v. 
Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826) (surety). 
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The other groups of general creditors, also represented among the 
secured group, consisted of relatives, landlords, and sheriffs, four opinions 
(9%).58 
The other main difference involved the significant presence of 
townspeople, twelve opinions (25% ), all dealing with service providers to the 
shipping industry.59 The remaining opinions (31 %) dealt with eight buyers, 
four stand-ins for several general creditors, and the federal government for 
custom duties three times.60 
So predominantly the guarantors, substantial commercial merchants for 
banks and inventory suppliers, and the sellers, equipment manufacturers, took 
security interests. They would become the proponents of the non possessory 
secured transaction. In contrast other commercial merchants, the buyers, the 
service providers, and the government did not take security interests. The 
latter two groups had or eventually obtained statutory liens for their 
58. For the relatives, landlord, and sheriff, see Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) 
(brother); Randall v. Cook, 17 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (sheriff); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 
Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (landlord); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819) (has debtor' s 
surname). 
59. For artisans, see Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096) 
(ship carpenter with judgment lien); Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me. 132 (1841) (Charlestown ship 
repairer); Tuckerv. Buffington,l5 Mass. (14 Tyng)477 (1819) (sail repairer); Ringv. Franklin, 
2 Hall I (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship repairer); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1810) (sail makers); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 (1846) (workers servicing boat); 
Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822) (ship master); Morgan's Executors v. 
Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 3 (1791) (seamen). For retailers, see Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Me. 474 
(1830) (ship supplier); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 288 (1823) (ship supplier); 
Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Hall. 121 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship chain seller); M'Intyre v. Scott, 
8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (ship chandler). 
60. For the buyers, see Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 (Adm. Ct. D. Pa. 1786) 
(No. 4,925) (ship buyer); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 
(1832); Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 
9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (company); Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 
1829) (as pledge); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Hooben v. Bidwell, 
16 Ohio 509 (1847). For the others, see Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (U.S. 
for duties); Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (U.S. for duties); United 
States v. Delaware Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942) (U.S. for duties); 
Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (trustee for creditors); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (II 
Tyng) 300 (1815) (executor); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (trustee for 
creditors); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) (assignee for benefit of creditors). 
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protection.61 The two former groups would become the advocates to ban the 
nonpossessory secured transaction. 
B. THE STRUCfURE 
Examination of the timing of taking the security interest, delineated in 
ninety-seven opinions (66%), revealed two major uses of the litigated 
nonpossessory secured transaction. First, secured creditors desired a 
preference over other creditors when they felt insecure for some reason. 
Thirty-eight of the opinions (39%) involved prior lendings.62 Only twenty-
three opinions (25%) concerned current lendings, excluding the purchase 
61. See 1 U.S. Stat. 627, 676 (1799) (government has priority for customs, but only in 
insolvency); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENT ARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 171-72 (13th eel. 1884) (New 
York in its Revised Code of 1829 provided shipwrights, material men, and suppliers of ships 
with a lien that ceased when the ship left the state). For ship supplier lien laws, see, e.g., Ind. 
Rev. Laws, c. 14, p. 120 (1838); I838 Jo. Terr. Laws, p. 67; 1834 Me. Laws, c. 104, p. I09; 
I848 Mass. Laws, c. 290, p. 770; I839 Mich. Laws, No. 43, p. 70; 1857 N.J. Laws, c. 138, p. 
382; 2 N.Y. Rev. St., pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 8, § I , p. 493 (1829); 1840 Ohio Laws, p. ItS; 1835 Pa. 
Laws, No. I73, p. 6I6. 
62. See Harris v. D' Wolf, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) ($300,000 prior advances); Toby 
v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) ($1700 prior debt); Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (183I) ($9700 
prior endorsements); Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (prior debt); Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Ill. (3 
Gilm.) 455 (1846) (prior debt); Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 Ill. (I Scam.) 300 (1836) (prior debt); 
Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 296 (1836) ($200 prior debt); Case v. Winship, 4 
Blackf. 425 (Ind. 1837) ($I 50 prior notes); Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. I835) ($48 
prior judgment); Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833) ($18 prior judgment); Lunt v. 
Whitaker, IO Me. 310 (1833) (prior debt); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14Pick.) 497 (1833) 
(advances made); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) (prior debts); Sumner 
v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) ($500 prior debt); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 
Pick.) 56 (1828) (payment of prior judgment lien); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 
(1826) ($7400 prior advance); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (second 
secured prior debts); Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., I9 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 
(1824) (prior endorsements); Parks v. Hall, I9 Mass. (2 Pick.) 206 (I824) ($IO,OOO prior 
advance); Bartlett v. Williams, I8 Mass. (1 Pick.) 288 (1823) ($2700 prior note); Lanfear v. 
Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (prior debt); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 
(18Il) (prior endorsements); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808) ($80,000 
prior debt); Jackson v. Dean, I Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845) ($200 past due rent); Haven v. Low, 
2 N.H. I3 (1819) ($400 prior advances); Hall v. Snowhill, I4 N.J.L. 551 (1835) ($900 prior 
debt); Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) ($100 prior debt); Levy v. Welsh, 
2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (first secured for $5200 prior advances); Gardner v. Adams, 
12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834)(prior $17 note paid); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1832) (prior $500 purchase price); McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1829) (prior $1500 debt); Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I827) (prior $IIOO 
notes); Bisset v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. I66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I824) ($120 past due rent); Hendricks v. 
Robinson, 2Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. I816) (prior$80,000advances); Myers v. Harvey, 39Pa. 
(2 Pen. & W.) 478 (183I) (prior judgment paid); Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 430 (I836)(prior $II 
debt); Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532 (1833) (prior $23 debt); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 
I826) (prior $I4 sale). 
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money loans, and eleven opinions (11 %) future lendings.63 The second major 
use related to purchase money lendings, with twenty-five opinions (26%).64 
Since the largest group of litigating secured parties used the 
non possessory secured transaction primarily to gain a preference when feeling 
63. Forthecurrentlendings, see Franklin Ins. Co. v. Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1826) (No. 5,057) (current $10,000); United States v. Delaware Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1823) (No. 14,941) (current $10,000); Hurry v. The John and Alice, 12 F. Cas. 1017 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 6,923), on retrial, Hurry v. Hurry's Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922) (current 1500 pounds sterling); Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 
(Adm. Ct. D. Pa. 1786) (No. 4,925) (current 214 pounds sterling); Letcher v. Norton, 5 Ill. (4 
Scam.) 575 (1843) (current note); Reed v.Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) ($80 advanced on date of 
security); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 (1833) (simultaneous debt of $200); 
Thorndike v. Stone, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 183 ( 1831 )(current $18,000); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. 
(10 Pick.) 522 (1830) ($200 current note); Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 (1824) 
($2000 current loan); Tucker v. Buffington, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819) ($10,000 current 
advance); Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Hall. 121 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) ($8000 current advance); 
Ring v. Franklin, 2 Hall! (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) ($6000 current advance); Ackley v. Finch, 7 
Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827)($120current advance); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) 
(current $34,500); Hornbeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839) (current note); Rogers v. Dare, 
Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) ($600 current repairs); Delaware Ins. Co. v. Archer, 
35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832)(current $17,000); Insurance Co. ofPa. v. Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. 
& Rawle) 138 (1822)(current $12,000); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822) 
(current 5000 pounds sterling); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) (current $5500 
endorsement); Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811) (current $2500 
advance); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 3 (1791) (1800 pounds current 
operating capital). Forthe future !endings, see Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 (1832) 
($240 note suretied); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827) (future unpaid rent); 
Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) ($3500 future advance); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 
Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823) (unmatured endorsed $2400 notes); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 
Tyng) 197 (1821) (future advances up to $5000); Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1837) ($175 note suretied); Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) ($100 note 
suretied); Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831) ($100 note suretied); Look v. Comstock, 
15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (if pay $60 note); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (future rent up to $800); Barrow v. Paxton·, 5Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
181 0) (future $400 annual rent). 
64. See Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11 ,096) ($380); Patten 
v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) ($900); Morris v. Grover, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 528 (1840) ($160); 
Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841) (remaining); Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) ($800); 
Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838) ($30 of $60); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) ($80); 
Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835)($172); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832) ($50); Sawyer 
v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832) ($170); Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827); Barrett 
v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (first secured $400); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 
(16 Tyng) 606 (1822) ($600); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817); Hussey v. 
Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808); Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) 
($500); Case v. Boughton, II Wend. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) ($140); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 
375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) ($2000); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (price of 
paid judgment); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Hooben v. 
Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 (1846) ($12,500); Jenkins v. 
Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837); Tobias v. 
Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830). 
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insecure, they frequently failed to document their nonpossessory secured 
transaction in a fashion designed to delineate clearly the security interest. 
Some purchase money lenders operated similarly. The opinions, some with 
more than one nonpossessory secured transaction, provided a description of 
the documents creating the non possessory secured transaction in one hundred 
forty-eight situations. Most either took the form of a chattel mortgage, fifty-
six opinions (38%),65 or of a bill of sale, forty-three opinions (29%).66 Both 
65. For mortgages on chattels, seeThe Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824)(No. 
9,187); Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824); Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 455 (1846); 
Letcher v. Norton, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 575 (1843); Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 300 (1836); 
Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. (l Scam.) 296 (1836); Case v. Winship, 4 Blackf. 425 (Ind. 1837); 
Hankins v. Ingols, 4 Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1835); Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 1835); 
Cutter v. Copeland, 18 Me. 127 (1841); Melody v. Chandler, 12 Me. 282 (1835); Lunt v. 
Whitaker, 10 Me. 310(1833); Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Me. 474 (1830); Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. 
(12 Pick.) 557 (1832); Flagg v. Dryden, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 52 (1828); Carrington v. Smith, 25 
Mass. (9 Pick.) 419 (1829); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 389 (1823); Portland Bank 
v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 (1810); Hall v. Snowhill, 14 N.J.L. 551 (1835); Randall v. 
Cook, 17Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.l837);Doanev.Eddy,l6Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.l837); 
Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. 
Ch. 1835); Gardnerv. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 
61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Case v. Boughton, II Wend. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); Ferguson v. 
Lee, 9 Wend. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); 
McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Divverv. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826); Collins v. Myers, 
16 Ohio 547 (1847); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 
(1846); Hornbeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 
275 (1819); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (I Yeates) 3 (1791); Woodward v. Gates, 9 
Vt. 358 (1837). For bottomry and respondentia bonds (ship and cargo mortgages made 
overseas under distress conditions), see Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) 
(respondentia); Franklin Ins. Co. v. Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5,057) 
(respondentia); The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9, 187) (bottomry); United 
States v. Delaware Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942) (respondentia); 
Hurry v. The John and Alice, 1iF. Cas. 1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 6,923), on retrial, Hurry 
v. Hurry's Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922) (bottomry); Forbes v. The 
Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 (Adm. Ct. D. Pa. 1786) (No. 4,925) (bottomry); Thorndike v. Stone, 28 
Mass. (11 Pick.) 183 (l831)(bottomry); Delaware Co. v. Archer, 35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832) 
(respondentia); Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822) 
(respondentia); Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811) (bottomry). For 
indentures, deeds of assignment, and deeds, see Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) 
(New York law) (deed of assignment); Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (indenture); Reed 
v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 (1830) (indenture); Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 
(1832) (deed); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) (deed); Hendricks v. Robinson, 
2Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (deed of assignment); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 Serg. 
& Rawle) 198 (1824) (deed); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822) 
(indenture). 
66. See Wilbur v. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1851) (Connecticut law); Starr v. 
Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817); Morris v. Grover, 2 Ill. (l Scam.) 528 (1840); Jordan v. Turner, 3 
Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833); Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 86 (1842); Abbott v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 
408 (1841); Flanders v. Barstow, 18 Me. 357 (1841); Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me. 132 (1841); 
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of these documents transferred ownership of the collateral to the secured 
party.67 But a significant number involved other forms, such as contracts, 
twenty-six (18%) opinions, receipts, ten opinions (7%), real estate deeds, six 
opinions (4%), oral agreements, five opinions (3%), or, in Pennsylvania, 
bailment leases, two opinions (1 %).68 
Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841); Ingraham v. Martin, 15 Me. 373 (1839); Smith v. Tilton, 
10 Me. 350 (1833); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832); Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832); 
Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 309 (1828); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 (1833); 
Adams v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 199 (1830); Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 
(1824); Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824); Parks 
v. Hall, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 206 (1824); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 288 (1823); 
Tucker v. Buffington, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 
300 (1815); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. 
(3 Tyng) 661 (1808); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820); Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 
244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Bailey v. Burton, 
8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831); Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Hall 121 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829); Ring v. 
Franklin, 2 Hall 1 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829); Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall 63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 
1829); Ludlowv. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821); Weller v. Wayland,!? Johns. 102 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); M'Intyre v. 
Scott, 8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); Brown v. Bement, 8 Johns. 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); 
Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Middlesworth v. Robinson, Wright 552 
(Ohio 1834); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832); Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 
430 (1836); Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532 (1833); Durkee v. Leland, 4 Vt. 612 (1832); Spaulding 
v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1830). Of these bills of sale, only Gleason involved a purchase money 
security interest. 
67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
68. For contracts, see Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096) 
(contract of sale); Ripley v. Dol bier, 18 Me. 382 (1841) (written instrument); Prichard v. Low, 
15 Me. 48 (1838) (sealed instrument); Soule v. White, 14 Me. 436 (1837) (instrument in 
writing); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) (contract); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) 
(contract); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832) (contract); Macomber v. Parker, 31 ~ass. (14 
Pick.) 497 (1833) (contract); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) 
(assignment); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (assignment); Lanfear v. 
Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (assignment); New England Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820) (assignment); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 
(1827) (contract of sale); Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827) (contract of sale); 
Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (182l)(consignment); Husseyv. Thomton,4 Mass. (3 
Tyng) 405 (1808) (contract ofsale); Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831) (contract of sale); Rogers 
v. Traders Ins. Co., 6 Paige Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1837) (assignment); Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 
218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (sealed instrument); Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1827) (agreement); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (written instrument); 
Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (agreement); Jenkins v. 
Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (sale and resale); Welsh v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (1 Pen. & 
W.) 57 (1829) (agreement); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) (assignment); Atwater 
v. Mower, 10 Vt. 75 (1838) (written instrument). For receipts, see Clark v. Richards, 1 Conn. 
53 (1814) (custom house enrollment); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) (bill of parcels); Bartels 
v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (bill of parcels); Haskell v. Greely, 3 Me. 425 (1825) (bill of 
parcels); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (bill of parcels); Peters v. Ballistier, 
20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826) (bill of lading); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 
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Other than the oral agreements, these forms should not provide a 
problem, provided the documentation established the non possessory secured 
transaction. Unfortunately for the secured party, frequently, the 
documentation did not establish the non possessory secured transaction. Often, 
in sixty-seven opinions ( 46% ), the secured party required additional evidence 
to establish or confirm the nonpossessory secured transaction. The title 
document typically established only an absolute sale. But under the rebuttable 
rule, the courts allowed consideration of this additional evidence. 69 
The most prevalent evidence (48% of the opinions) involved 
supplementary documents of the same type as the primary documents.70 The 
(1824) (receipt); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822) (memorandum); Haven 
v. Low, 2 N.H. l3 (l819)(customhouseenrollment); Fletcherv. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826) 
(memorandum). For real estate documents, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (mortgage); 
Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (deed); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 
(1827) (lease); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) (mortgage); Sturgis v. Warren, 
11 Vt. 433 (1839) (mortgage); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830) (mortgage). For oral 
agreements, see Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) (agreement); Ferguson v. 
Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (declaration); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 
696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (sale); Jackson v. Dean, I Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845) (agreement); 
Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Raw1e) 214 (1826) (agreement). For bailment leases, see 
Clark v. Jack, 47 Pa. (7 Watts) 375 (1838); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831). 
See also supra note 26 for an explanation of bailment leases. 
69. Early Connecticut cases, using the absolute-conditional rule, refused to admit 
supplemental defeasance contracts to contradict title documents, namely ship enrollments, in 
absolute form. See Starrv. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (defeasance contract); Clark v. Richards, 
I Conn. 53 (1 814) (conditional bill of sale). See infra note 97 and accompanying text for the 
absolute-conditional rule. 
70. For defeasance contracts (chattel mortgages), see Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 
(181 7); Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) (mortgage); Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Me. 474 (1830); 
Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (deed); Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall 63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 
1829) (deed of trust); Ring v. Franklin, 2 Hall! (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829); Stutson v. Brown, 7 
Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Brown v. Bement, 8Johns. 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 18ll); Insurance 
Co. ofPa. v. Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822) (foreclosure agreement); Jennings v. 
Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811); Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532 (1833). For bills 
of sale, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832); Clark v. Richards, I Conn. 53 (1814); Lane v. 
Borland,14Me. 77 (l836);Thorndike v. Stone, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 183 (1831); Haven v. Low, 
2 N.H. 13 (1819); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822). For receipts, see 
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 386 (1828) (bill of lading); Franklin Ins. Co. v. 
Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 5,057) (memorandum); United States v. Delaware 
Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,492) (bill oflading); Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 
Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) (bill of parcels); Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824) (memorandum); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 288 
(1823) (memorandum); Delaware Co. v. Archer, 35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832) (memorandum); 
Dawes v. Cope, l3 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811) (bill oflading); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 
Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824)(confirmation). For contracts, see Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me. 132 
(1841) (bond); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821) (contract); Tuckerv. Buffington, 
15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819) (unsealed writing); Gardner v. Adams,l2 Wend. 297 (N.Y. 
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next most prevalent evidence consisted of oral security agreements, twenty-
seven opinions (40%).71 The different type of supplemental instrument 
involved lease backs and recordations, eight opinions (12%).72 
In the pre-chattel mortgage act era, the commercial merchant class 
demanded the non possessory secured transaction when they became insecure. 
They had previously guaranteed the loan or made the loan as a purchase 
money lender and later obtained the security interest for protection against an 
impending judgment lien. As a result, their documentation for the transaction 
frequently appeared in several documents and often in oral agreements. 
II. AMERICAN LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE NONPOSSESSORY SECURED 
TRANSACTION 
But secured parties experienced difficulty in enforcing these poorly 
drafted, hastily taken nonpossessory secured transactions against the parties 
that mattered, the judgment lienholders. Judgment lienholders continued their 
practices from the collusive judgment era by obtaining the sheriff's levy on 
the collateral. Sheriffs levied because the applicable court rule permitted jury 
determination of the validity of the non possessory secured transaction. Thus, 
the newly emergent secured parties had to sue to recover the collateral as its 
owner and stood a chance of losing it, depending on the impressions of a jury. 
Sup. Ct. 1834) (assignment); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (instrument); 
Durkee v. Leland, 4 Vt. 612 (1832) (unsealed writing). 
71. See Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824); Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 455 
(1846); Case v. Winship, 4 Blackf. 425 (Ind. 1837); Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841); 
Flanders v. Barstow, 18 Me. 357 (1841); Smith v. Tilton, lOMe. 350 (1833); Gleason v. Drew, 
9 Me. 79 (1832); Ulmerv. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832); Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 309 (1828); Reed 
v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 (1833); Shumway v. 
Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828); Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827); 
Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 
(1821); New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820); Jewett v. 
Warren, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 300 (1815); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808); 
Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820); Randall v. Cook, 
17 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Divver 
v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Halll21 (N.Y. Super. 
Ct. 1829); Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); M'Intyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 159 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1830). 
72. See Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (realty recordation); Hankins v. Ingols, 4 
Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1835) (realty recordation); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) 
(leaseback); Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 (1824) (leaseback); Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. 
(2 Pick.) 206 (1824) (leaseback); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) (realty 
leaseback); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) (leaseback); Woodward 
v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837) (recorded under N.H. chattel mortgage act). 
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A. THETYPEOFACTION 
One hundred thirty-five opinions (92%) described the type oflitigation. 
The vast majority of opinions, one hundred seven (79% ), involved the secured 
party suing, or being sued by, a third party. These opinions involved the 
priority rule. 
The remaining opinions did not pertain to third parties contesting the 
efficacy of the non possessory secured transaction. These remaining opinions 
did not involve the priority rule.73 The second largest grouping, fourteen 
opinions (10%), had to do with secured parties contending with the debtor.74 
Most, eight opinions, dealt with wrongful retention of the property, almost all 
concerned the trover action.75 The remaining six dealt with contractual 
matters.76 The third largest grouping, thirteen opinions (10%), referred to 
various contractual matters with third parties. Most, nine opinions, involved 
the secured party's liability to those providing service to the collateral.77 All 
73. Courts enforced fraudulent conveyances between the parties. Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act of 1571, supra note 15, at§ I, reprinted in 4 Stat. of Realm, supra note 11 , 
at 537. 
74. For secured parties as plaintiff, see Wilburv. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1851); 
Case v. Winship, 4 Blackf. 425 (Ind. 1837); Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841); Rogers v. 
Traders Ins. Co., 6 Paige Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1837); Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1836); Atwater v. Mower, 10 Vt. 75 (1838); Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532 (1833); Durkee v. 
Leland, 4 Vt. 612 (1832). For debtors as plaintiff, see Flanders v. Barstow, 18 Me. 357 (1841); 
Smith v. Tilton, 10 Me. 350 (1833); Case v. Boughton, II Wend. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); 
Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Brown v. Bement, 8 Johns. 96 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1811); Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 430 (1836). The Fraudulent Conveyance Act provided for 
enforcement between the parties. See Fraudulent Conveyance Act, supra note 15, at § 1, 
reprinted in 4 Stat. of Realm, supra note ll, at 538. 
75. See Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841); Smith v. Tilton, 10 Me. 350 (1833); 
Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Brown v. Bement, 8 Johns. 96 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1811); Atwater v. Mower, 10 Vt. 75 (1838); Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 430 (1836); Gifford v. 
Ford, 5 Vt. 532 (1833). For replevin, see Case v. Winship, 4 Blackf. 425 (Ind. 1837). For 
trover and replevin actions, see infra, note 87 and accompanying text. 
76. See Wilbur v. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1851) (accounting); Flanders v. 
Barstow, 18 Me. 357 (184l)(assumpsit); Rogers v. Traders Ins. Co.,6 PaigeCh. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 
1837) (bill to recover insurance proceeds); Elderv. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) 
(debt); Case v. Boughton, II Wend. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (covenant); Durkee v. Leland, 
4 Vt. 612 (1832) (assumpsit). 
77. See Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096) (ship 
carpenter); Wins1owv. Tarbox, l8 Me.l32(184l)(shiprepairer);Colson v. Bonzey, 6Me.474 
(1830) (ship supplier); Tucker v. Buffington, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819) (sail makers); 
Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Hall121 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship chain supplier); Ring v. Franklin, 
2 Hall 1 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (ship repairer); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1827) (shipper); M' lntyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (ship chandler); 
Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (sail makers). 
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treated contractual and quasi-contractual actions. 78 Two dealt with judgment 
lien creditors suing sheriffs for wrongful levy, a tort action.79 Two opinions 
concerned the debtor or secured party suing on an insurance policy, a 
contractual matter.80 The remaining opinion (1 %) dealt with the debtor as a 
tort victim.81 
Of the one hundred seven opinions treating the priority rule, the largest 
single subset, eighty opinions (75% ), involved the secured party contending 
with a judgment lien creditor, or his stand-in the sheriff, who had wrongfully 
taken the collateral, owned by the secured party, by levying against the 
property of the debtor. In most of these opinions, seventy-four, the secured 
party brought the lawsuit.82 Occasionally, six times, the judgment lienholder 
78. See Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096) (indebitatus 
assumpsit); Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me. 132 (1841) (suit for repairs); Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Me. 
474 (1830) (action for supplies); Tucker v. Buffington, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 477 (1819) 
(assumpsit); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (case); M'Intyre v. Scott, 8 
Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (action for value); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 808 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (assumpsit). 
79. See Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 86 (1842) (general's administrator v. sheriffs 
administrator); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) (judgment lien v. sheriff). 
80. See Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824) 
(debtor v. insurer); Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811) (secured party 
v. insurer). 
81. See Middlesworth v. Robinson, Wright 552 (Ohio 1834). 
82. See Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (federal marshall); Conard v. 
Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (federal marshall); Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 
(1832) (execution officer); Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (constable); Rhines v. Phelps, 
8 III. (3 Gilm.) 455 (1846) (sheriff); Letcher v. Norton, 5 III. (4 Scam.) 575 (1843); Kitchell v. 
Bratton, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 300 (1836); Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. (I Scam.) 296 (1836); 
Hankins v. lngols, 4 Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1835); Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 1835); 
Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833); Abbott v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408 (1841) (deputy 
sheriff); Cutter v. Copeland, 18 Me. 127 (1841) (sheriff); Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) 
(deputy sheriff); Ingraham v. Martin, 15 Me. 373 (1839) (sheriff); Melody v. Chandler, 12 Me. 
282 (1835) (officer); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832) (officer); Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 
(1832) (officer); Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (sheriff); Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 309 
(1828) (constable); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) (deputy sheriff); Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 
146 (1826) (deputy sheriff); Haskell v. Greely, 3 Me. 425 (1825) (deputy sheriff); Macomber 
v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833)(sheriff); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 
(1833) (sheriff); Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 (1832) (judgment lien); Merrill v. 
Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) (sheriff); Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 
(1832) (deputy sheriff); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 (1830) (deputy sheriff); Adams 
v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 199 (1830) (deputy sheriff); Carrington v. Smith, 25 Mass. (9 
Pick.) 419 (1829) (deputy sheriff); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (sheriff); 
Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 (1827) (sheriff); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 
522 (1827) (sheriff); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) (sheriff); Homes v. Crane, 
19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 (1824) (sheriff); Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 206 (1824) (sheriff); 
Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 288 (1823) (deputy sheriff); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 
Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822) (deputy sheriff); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821) 
(sheriff); Lanfearv. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821)(deputy sheriff); Putnam v. Dutch, 
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sued the secured party.83 The second largest subset, twelve opinions (11 %), 
treated the secured party battling a purchaser of the collateral who bought 
from the debtor.84 The third largest subset, eleven opinions (11 %), related to 
secured parties fighting general creditors.85 Seldom did a secured party 
8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811) (deputy sheriff); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 
(1810) (deputy sheriff); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808) (deputy sheriff); 
Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808)(attaching officers); Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. 
519 (Mich. 1845) (sheriff); Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831) (deputy sheriff); Haven v. Low, 
2 N.H. 13 (1819) (deputy sheriff); Hall v. Snowhill, 14 N.J.L. 551 (1835) (sheriff); Randall v. 
Cook, 17 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (sheriff); Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1837) Gudgment lien); Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) Gudgment 
lien); Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (secured' s assignee); Ferguson 
v. Lee, 9 Wend. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (secured's assignee); Langdon v. Bue1, 9 Wend. 80 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (sheriff); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (sheriff); 
McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) Gudgment lien); Divver v. 
McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (deputy sheriff); Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow. 732 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) Gudgment lien); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) 
(bailiff); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) Gudgment lien); Ludlow v. Hurd, 
19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) Gudgment lien); Weller v. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1819) (deputy sheriff); Collins v. Meyer, 16 Ohio 547 (1847); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 
Ohio 72 (1846); Clark v. Jack, 47 Pa. (7 Watts) 375 (1838) (sheriff); Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 
44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (sheriff); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831) 
Gudgment lien); Martin v. Mathiot,.29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (sheriff); Clow v. 
Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819),(sheriff); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 
Yeates) 3 (1791) (admiralty marshall); Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433 (1839) (deputy sheriff); 
Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837) (constable); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830) 
(execution official). 
83. See Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831) (deputy sheriff); Badlam v. 
Tucker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823) (sheriff); Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1834) Gudgrnent lien); Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831) Gudgment lien); Hendricks 
v. Robinson, 2Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (judgment lien); Spauldingv. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 
(1830) (constable). 
84. For secured parties as plaintiff.'see Morris v. Grover, 2 III. (1 Scam.) 528 (1840); 
Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 
Me. 341 (1835); Lunt v. Whitaker, 10 Me. 310 (1833); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me.47 (1832); Lewis 
v. Stevenson, 2 Hall63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1810); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847); Hornbeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839). 
For purchasers as plaintiff, see Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Ferguson 
v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832). 
85. For secured parties as plaintiff, see Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 
(1827); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (11 
Tyng) 300 (1815) (debtor's administrator); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820) (bailee 
with notice); Welsh v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (1 Pen. & W.) 57 (1829) (debtor's executor). Statutes 
provided that executors and administrators pay debts of creditors before legacies. See, e.g., 
Royce v. Burrell, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 395 (1815) (citing Stat. 1783, c. 36, § 3); Lee v. Wright, 
33 Pa. (l Rawle) 149 (1829). For general creditors as plaintiff, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 
63 (1831); Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817); Clark v. Richards, 1 Conn. 53 (1814); New 
England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820); Passmore v. Eldridge, 
27 Pa. (12 Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824)(insolvency trustee); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 
1826) (pledgee not in possession). 
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confront another secured party, never-the-less, they contested in four opinions 
(4%).86 These opinions all dealt with the fraudulent conveyance challenge to 
the nonpossessory secured transaction. 
The reason for so few battles between secured parties lay with legal 
theory. The debtor had transferred ownership of the collateral to the first 
secured party and had nothing left to transfer to the second secured party 
except the right of redemption under a chattel mortgage or the right to 
repurchase under a conditional bill of sale, provided the debtor had not created 
secret mortgages. Parties did not develop the nonpossessory secured 
transaction to defeat fellow secured parties. 
Most of the actions brought by the parties in the litigation related to 
trespass, replevin, and trover. Property owners used trespass to recover 
damages for injury to their property. The English writ system used by the 
northern states designed two actions, replevin and trover, for personal 
property owners to retrieve or obtain compensation for property wrongfully 
taken. Parties used replevin to stop a levying sheriff, or another, by claiming 
ownership of the chattels. They brought trover, the damage action for 
conversion, when the defendant no longer held the personalty.87 
Of those one hundred seven actions between the secured party and a 
third party, ninety-three opinions (87%) sought these three remedies. The 
secured party clearly required litigation to enforce his ownership rights. 
Thirty opinions treated trespass actions. 88 Twenty-nine pertained to replevin 
86. See The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9,187) (second v. first); 
Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (first v. second); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 
438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (first v. second); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) 
(first v. second). 
87. HOWSWORTH, supra note 17, at 285 (trespass); J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ENGUSH LEGAL HISTORY 333 (1979) (replevin). 
88. For trespass actions involving judgment lien creditors, see Conard v. Atlantic Ins. 
Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (won, after); Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (lost, 
unspecified); Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (lost, unspecified); Abbott v. Goodwin, 20 
Me. 409 (1841) (won, unspecified); Cutterv. Copeland, 18 Me. 127 (1841) (won, unspecified); 
Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) (won, before); Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832) (won, 
unspecified); Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (won, before); Haskell v. Greely, 3 Me. 425 
(1825) (won, after); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 (1833) (won, unspecified); 
Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) (lost, unspecified); Sumner v. Hamlet, 
29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (183l)(won, unspecified); Adams v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 199 
(1830) (won, unspecified); Carrington v. Smith, 25 Mass. (9 Pick.) 419 (1829) (won, before); 
Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 206 (1824)(won, before); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 
197 (1821) (won, unspecified); Hall v. Snowhill, 14 N.J.L. 551 (1835) (won, unspecified); 
Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (won, unspecified); Ferguson v. Lee, 9 
Wend. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (lost, unspecified); Langdon v. Bue1, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1832) (lost, unspecified); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (lost, 
unspecified); Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (won, before); Weller v. 
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actions.89 Twenty-eight referred to trover actions.90 Six opinions had to do 
Wayland, I? Johns. l02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)(won, before); Clark v. Jack,47 Pa. (?Watts) 375 
(1838) (won, unspecified); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (lost, 
unspecified); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) (lost, before); Sturgis v. 
Warren, II Vt. 433 (1839) (lost, unspecified); Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1830) (won, 
unspecified). The parentheticals show whether the secured won or lost and whether the third 
party's debt came before or after the secured parties' debt. See infra notes 94-95 and 
accompanying text for the analysis of these matters. For trespass actions dealing with general 
creditors, see Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826) (won, before). For trespass actions 
concerning another secured party, see Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) 
(won, after). 
89. For replevin actions involving judgment lien creditors, see Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 
U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (won, after); Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 455 (1846) (lost, 
unspecified); Ingraham v. Martin, 15 Me. 373 (1839) (won, unspecified); Gleason v. Drew, 9 
Me. 79 (1832) (won, unspecified); Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 309 (1828) (won, unspecified); 
Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) (won, unspecified); Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (won, 
before); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833) (won, unspecified); Johns v. 
Church, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 (I 832) (won, unspecified); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 
522 (1830) (won, unspecified); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827) (lost, 
unspecified); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) (won, unspecified); Homes v. 
Crane, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 (1824) (won, after); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 288 
(1823) (won, after); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822) (won, before); Putnam 
v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811) (won, before); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 
Tyng) 422 (1810) (won, after); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808) (won, 
before); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808) (won, before); Jackson v. Dean, l 
Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845) (won, before); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819) (won, unspecified); 
Randall v. Cook, 17 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (lost, unspecified); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 
375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (won, before); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831) 
(won, before). For replevin actions dealing with purchasers, see Morris v. Grover, 2 Ill. (1 
Scam.) 528 (1840) (lost, after); Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838) (won, after); Murray v. 
Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (won, after); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 
(1847) (won, after); Hornbeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839) (won, after). 
90. For trover actions involving judgment lien creditors, see Melody v. Chandler, 12 
Me. 282 (1835) (won, unspecified); Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 (1832) (won, 
after); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (lost, unspecified); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 
Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 (1827) (won, after); Badlam v. Tucker,l8 Mass. (l Pick.) 389 (1823) (won, 
unspecified); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (182l)(lost, before); Ash v. Savage, 
5 N.H. 545 (1831) (won, unspecified); Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) 
(lost, unspecified); Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (lost, before); 
Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (lost, after); McLachlan v. Wright, 3 
Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (lost, before); Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1827) (lost, before); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (won, before); Bisset 
v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (won, unspecified); Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 44 
Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (won, unspecified); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (I Yeates) 
3 (1791) (won, unspecified); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837) (lost, unspecified); Tobias 
v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 ( 1830) (lost, unspecified). For trover actions dealing with purchasers, see 
Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) (won, after); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (won, 
after); Lunt v. Whitaker, 10 Me. 310 (1833) (won, after); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832) 
(won, after); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (won, after); 
Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (won, after). For trover actions 
concerning general creditors, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (I 831) (lost, unspecified); 
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with an admiralty version of the same actions, a libel, or a western version of 
the same actions, a statutory action for right of property. 91 Nine actions (8%) 
involved equity actions, such as bills to foreclose, for an accounting, or for 
discovery, and other damage actions. 92 The remaining five opinions ( 5%) did 
not identify the action.93 
Under these actions, the secured party won most of the time, seventy-six 
times out of the one hundred seven.94 Obviously, the fraudulent conveyance 
argument against the non possessory secured transaction did not carry the day 
under the eighteenth century priority rule. But on a state by state basis, the 
fraudulent conveyance argument did matter. 
Five states, three Eastern New England states and New Jersey and 
Michigan, generally upheld the nonpossessory secured transaction. Four of 
these five states upheld the nonpossessory secured transaction every time a 
party raised the fraudulent conveyance objection: Maine seventeen times, New 
Hampshire twice, New Jersey twice, and Michigan once. Massachusetts 
upheld it over eighty percent of the time with twenty-four of twenty-nine 
opinions. 
Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 300 (1815) (won, before); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. 
(3 Pick.) 495 ( 1826) (won, before). For trover actions treating another secured party, see Barrett 
v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (won, after). 
91. For the libel action dealing with another secured party, see The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 
938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9,187) (admiralty case: lost, after). The court handled the 
nonpossessory secured transaction under the common law since the transaction did not satisfy 
admiralty requirements for a bottomry bond. Admiralty law required that the loan secured by 
the bottomry bond be for a necessity to continue the voyage. For right to payment actions 
involving judgment lien creditors, see Letcher v. Norton, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 575 (1843) (won, 
unspecified); Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 300 (1836) (won, unspecified); Hankins v. 
lngols, 4 Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1835) (won, unspecified); Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 
1835) (won, unspecified); Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833) (lost, unspecified). 
92. For equity actions involving judgment lien creditors, see Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 
339 (N.Y. 1831) (discovery: lost, unspecified); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. 
Ch. 1816) (accounting: won, unspecified); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 (1846) (foreclosure: 
lost, before). For damage actions dealing with purchasers, see Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall63 
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (indebitatus assumpsit: won, after). For damage actions concerning 
general creditors, see Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (book debt: lost, after); Clark v. 
Richards, 1 Conn. 53 (1814) (case: lost, after); Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 
(1827) (assumpsit: won, after); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820) (case: won, after). For 
equity actions treating another secured party, see Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 
1835) (foreclosure: won, unspecified). 
93. For unidentified actions involving judgment lien creditors, see Thornton v. 
Davenport, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 296 (1836) (won, unspecified); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 
(1847) (lost, unspecified). For unidentified actions dealing with general creditors, see New 
England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820) (won, after); Welsh v. 
Bekey, 38 Pa. (1 Pen. & W.) 57 (1829) (lost, before and after); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 
Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824) (won, unspecified). 
94. See supra notes 88-93 for cases won or lost. 
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Five additional states, the two major mid-Atlantic states, New York and 
Pennsylvania, and three western states had difficulty upholding the 
transaction, yet enforced it more than fifty-five percent of the time: New York 
with fourteen of twenty-four opinions, Pennsylvania with five of eight 
opinions, Ohio with three of five opinions, Indiana with two of three opinions, 
and lllinois with three of five opinions. But New York's difficulty did not 
arise until after 1828. Through 1828 New York courts upheld the 
non possessory secured transaction eighty-eight percent of the time, but only 
forty percent of the time after 1828. Pennsylvania also observed a 
discontinuity. Before the development of the bailment lease in 1831, 
Pennsylvania courts upheld the non possessory secured transaction only thirty-
three percent of the time. After 1830 Pennsylvania courts upheld the bailment 
lease in each of two opinions before 1840. 
Two states had extreme difficulty upholding the transaction. The states 
of Western New England, Connecticut and Vermont, found the transaction 
fraudulent most of the time: Connecticut with six of six opinions and Vermont 
with three of five opinions. 
The other northern states, Rhode Island, Iowa, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota, had no opinions. 
Moreover, the secret nonpossessory secured transaction, unknown to a 
subsequent creditor, had no significant correlation to the results. Only fifty-
four opinions identified whether the other creditor incurred his debt before the 
secured party obtained his security interest, a preference, or came after the 
secured party, a secret lien.95 Twenty-four involved preferences, thirty dealt 
with secret liens. On a state-by-state basis the secret liens appeared as 
follows: Maine, six of nine; Vermont, none of one; Massachusetts, eight of 
seventeen; Connecticut, three of three; New Jersey, one of one; New York, 
seven of fifteen; Pennsylvania, one of two; Ohio, three of four; lllinois, one 
of one; and Michigan, none of one. So courts enforced secret liens in large 
numbers. 
Third parties objected to enforcement of the nonpossessory secured 
transaction, not because the debtor had kept it secret, but because the title 
documentation indicated an absolute sale. Only because of supplemental 
documentation did the secured party win. Judgment lienholders did not think 
about challenging the secrecy aspect since they had enjoyed the benefit of 
secrecy during the collusive judgment era. All they thought to challenge was 
the honesty of the competing non possessory secured transaction. 
95. See supra notes 62-63 for cases involving preferences or secret liens. 
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B. THE AMERICAN COURTS' RULES 
Although the early American courts enforced the non possessory secured 
transaction frequently, the large number of trespass, replevin, and trover 
actions indicated that the rules the courts used did not work well. The courts' 
rules resulted in interference with the nonpossessory secured transaction by 
third parties. The secured party most often prevailed at the courthouse after 
litigation, but stood a chance of losing, depending on the state. 
The rule American courts used to handle these hasty, poorly documented 
nonpossessory secured transactions, in the one hundred seven opinions 
challenging the validity of the transaction, numbered four. Two of the rules, 
the absolute-conditional rule and the per se fraud rule determined the 
effectiveness of the nonpossessory secured transaction under a black and 
white rule applied by the judges. 96 These two rules should preclude much 
litigation. Under a black and white rule, sheriffs could determine without 
litigation the transaction's validity when the secured party first challenged 
levy. The third, the heightened rebuttable rule, allowed the judges to set the 
standard. So in these jurisdictions the rule would generate litigation until the 
respective court established the standards. The fourth, the rebuttable rule, 
however, left the matter for the jury. In these jurisdictions, hopes for a 
favorable jury pronouncement would lead those with shaky positions to pursue 
litigation. And the hope of changing the rule to the rebuttable rule fostered 
litigation in the other jurisdictions. 
English Courts had used the absolute-conditional rule, devised for the 
benefit of the landed aristocrats, before the 1677 Statute of Frauds to 
determine whether settlor, seller, or debtor possession constituted fraud.97 
Under this rule, if the transaction documents indicated an absolute sale, one 
without any conditions, but the parties permitted debtor retention of 
possession, the court would find the transaction a fraudulent conveyance and 
would not enforce it against adversely affected third parties. But if the 
transaction documents indicated a conditional sale, one contingent upon some 
event, and if the debtor retention of possession was consistent with the 
conditions, then the court would enforce it against adversely affected third 
parties. This rule allowed the judge to determine absoluteness or conditions 
from the document as a question of law. A jury only need determine 
compliance with the conditions. 
96. See Butler v. VanWyck, 1 Hi11438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (explaining the impact 
of the New York rebuttable rule statute). 
97. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 29-33 nn.123-39 (absolute-conditional 
rule enunciated in 1615 and obsoleted by sale of goods provision of the 1677 Statute of Frauds). 
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The per se fraud rule deemed void with respect to third parties any 
transaction that exhibited debtor possession of the collateral, namely all 
non possessory secured transactions. English courts used the per se fraud rule 
only under bankruptcy law.98 The heightened rebuttable rule, an American 
invention,99 resembled the rebuttable rule but required more than just the 
nonpossessory secured transaction to rebut the presumption of fraud from the 
debtor's possession of the collateral. 
Five states opted for determination by the judge. Three northeastern 
states, Pennsylvania before 1820 (in 1791), Connecticut before 1824 (in 1814, 
1817, and 1823), and Vermont before 1830(in 1826), adhered to the absolute-
conditional rule before abandoning it for either the per se fraud rule or the 
heightened rebuttable rule. 100 These states found the absolute-conditional rule 
unacceptable. Pennsylvania in 1819 adopted the per se fraud rule.101 Justices 
in Connecticut in 1823 and in Vermont in 1829, after their state legislatures 
passed the sale of goods provision of the 1677 Statute of Frauds in 1821 and 
1823, 102 respectively, adopted the heightened rebuttable rule. But these 
jurisdictions merely traded one question of law for another, avoiding the 
lottery with the jury under the rebuttable rule. And two western states, 
Indiana in 1833 and lllinois in 1836, aware ofthe rebuttable rule and to avoid 
its lottery effect, opted for the absolute-conditional rule. 103 
Those states applying the rebuttable rule and the heightened rebuttable 
rule suffered the most litigation by far, ninety-one opinions. Since this group 
included only two of the three main commercial states, this imbalance did not 
98. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 40-45 nn.172-86. 
99. See Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1812). 
100. For secured party victory with debtor's possession condition absent, see Morgan's 
Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 3 (1791) (at sea exception to rule, secured party's 
possession impossible until arrival, so deemed consistent with mortgage); Fletcher v. Howard, 
2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826) (applying absolute portion of rule to void prior competing absolute sale, 
secured party in possession wins). For secured party defeat with debtor's possession condition 
absent in the primary document, but possibly present in supplemental documentation, see Starr 
v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (bill of sale and defeasance contract inadmissable to contradict 
custom house enrollment showing absolute ownership); Clark v. Richards, I Conn. 53 (1814) 
(bill of sale with mortgage provisions inadmissable, due to privity requirement, to contradict 
custom house enrollment showing absolute ownership). 
101. Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819). 
102. 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 17, reprinted in 5 Stat. of Realm, supra note II, at 839, 841; see 
also Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, for the rise of the rebuttable rule caused by the sale 
of goods provision. In England the rebuttable rule, which leaves the matter to the jury, may 
have operated well for the class in power, since courts selected jurors from that class, the 
aristocracy. See AlEXIS DE TOCQUEVIUE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 233 (1945). However, in 
the United States courts selected jurors from the masses. /d. 
103. Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833)(rejecting the rebuttable rule); Thornton 
v. Davenport, 2 Ill. (I Scam.) 296 (1836) (rejecting the per se fraud rule). 
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arise solely due to commercial activity. The rebuttable rule fostered litigation. 
The large number of opinions dealing with the debtor's possession condition 
in the primary documentation, thirty-eight opinions, confirmed the fostering 
effect. 104 The parties could have easily resolved these matters under the prior 
absolute-conditional rule without litigation. The large number of opinions in 
this category lost by the secured party, fourteen, suggests the reason for the 
litigation. Under the rebuttable rule as well as the heightened rebuttable rule, 
a general creditor could possibly destroy the nonpossessory secured 
transaction through a favorable jury or judicial panel. This became a real 
threat in Connecticut after 1824, New York after 1826, Vermont after 1830, 
and in Massachusetts after 1832. In those years a secured party in this 
category actually lost. 
The debate in those states following the rebuttable rule and the 
heightened rebuttable rule dealt with what circumstances would rebut the 
presumption. For one set of states, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York before 1829, and Ohio, the rebuttable rule 
meant that the secured party need only present evidence of the security 
arrangement to rebut the fraud presumption caused by debtor possession, 
104. For secured party victories with debtor's possession condition in the primary 
document, see Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (New York law); Abbott 
v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408 (1841); Ingraham v. Martin, 15 Me. 373 (1839); Lane v. Borland, 14 
Me. 77 (1836); Melody v. Chandler, 12 Me. 282 (1835); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832); 
Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833); 
Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 76 (1831); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 
(1830); Adams v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 199 (1830); Carrington v. Smith, 25 Mass. (9 
Pick.) 419 (1829); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 (1827); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. 
(3 Pick.) 495 (1826); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824); Badlam v. Tucker,l8 
Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823); Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845); Hall v. Snowhill, 14 
N.J.L. 551 (1835); Levyv. Welsh, 2Edw. Ch.438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835); Ferguson v. Union Furnace 
Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1829); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 
( 184 7). For secured party defeats with debtor's possession condition in the primary document, 
see The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9,187) (voiding prior mortgage against 
bottomry bond); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832) (secured party could not 
identify bricks subject to security interest); Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) 
(possession given as accommodation to debtor); Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1834) (possession given as accommodation to debtor); Ferguson v. Lee, 9 Wend. 258 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1832) (mortgage in default, so presently in absolute form); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 
80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (fraud not challenged as secured party had assigned notes but not 
mortgage); Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831) (fraud as payoff three times value of 
debt); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (mortgage does not reflect true 
deal); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (priority oflandlord's lien); Collins 
v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) (due to debtor power of disposition); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 
Ohio 72 (1846) (priority of service person's liens); Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433 (1839); 
Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830). 
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either through documentation or witness accounts of the parties' intentions. 
But a second set of states, New York after 1828, Connecticut after 1823, and 
Vermont after 1829, required additional evidence under the heightened 
rebuttable rule. Unfortunately, under either the rebuttable rule or the 
heightened rebuttable rule, leaving the debtor in possession of the collateral 
insured that the rebuttal could occur in the courthouse. 105 
The large number of opinions treating the debtor's possession condition 
in the secondary documentation or its absence, fifty-two, suggests the use of 
the rebuttable rule. 106 Of these opinions, the secured party won thirty-nine. 
105. See, e.g., Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (debtor possession 
requires the secured party "to show why the possession was so left"). 
106. For secured party victories with debtor's possession condition in the supplemental 
document, see Patton v. Smith, 4 Conn. 450 (1823) (rebuttable rule demands retrial), after 
retrial, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (adopting heightened rebuttable rule); Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 
309 (1828); Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 607 (1824); New England Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820); Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831); Hendricks v. 
Mount, 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Bisset v. 
Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 
1832); Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1829). For secured party defeats with debtor's 
possession condition in the supplemental document, see Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824); 
Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. (2Pick.) 206 (1824) (rare Massachusetts case using absolute-conditional 
rule); Randall v. Cook,17Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (possession given as accommodation 
to debtor). For secured party victories with debtor's possession condition possibly in 
supplemental document, see Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 
(1832); Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (I 827); Bartels v. Harris, 
4 Me. 146 (1826); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 (1833); Whitwell v. Vincent, 
21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 288 (1823); Rice v. 
Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (I 1 Tyng) 300 (1815); 
Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819); Lewis v. 
Stevenson, 2 Hall63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829). For secured party defeats with debtor's possession 
condition possibly in supplemental document, see Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 
(1828) (follows Lanfear); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (rare 
Massachusetts case applying absolute-conditional rule noted by the reporter as in error, but 
dealing with Pennsylvania security interest void under per se rule in Pennsylvania); Stutson v. 
Brown, 7 Cow. 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (fraud when made pending judgment). For secured 
party victories with debtor's possession condition absent, see Harris v. D'Wo1f, 29 U.S. ( 4 Pet.) 
147 (1830) (New York law); Cutter v. Copeland, 18 Me. 127 (1841); Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 
48 (1838); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835); Lunt v. Whitaker,10 Me. 310 (1833); Haskell 
v. Greely, 3 Me. 425 (1825); Hunt v. Holton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 (1832); Johns v. Church, 
29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 (1832); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827); Marston v. 
Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811); 
Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 (1810); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 
Tyng) 661 (1808); Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Patchin v. Pierce,12 
Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821); Weller 
v. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 
(N.Y. Ch. 1816); Hornbeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839) (provision had expired). For 
secured party defeats with debtor's possession condition absent, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 
(1832); Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (nonpossessory secured transaction alone not 
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Under the absolute-conditional rule, the secured party would have lost them 
all. So the rebuttable rule permitted the implication of a nonpossessory 
condition for the security interest when the documentation failed to do so. 
This rule aided the secured party who only hastily took a security interest 
when the debtor began to become insolvent. Yet opinions adopting a 
successor rule to the absolute-conditional rule reflected no rational derivation 
from English common law,107 nor any connection to party affiliation, much 
less any connection to, or revulsion from, aiding the last minute secured party. 
The early Massachusetts opinions lack citations to the source of, or 
policy behind, the rebuttable rule until 1823.108 Three old-school 
Massachusetts Federalists, Theophilus Parsons, Samuel Sewall, and George 
Thatcher, delivered Hussey v. Thornton, 109 the first opinion in Massachusetts 
to treat the nonpossessory secured transaction, written by Parsons in 1808.110 
Parsons merely rejected defendant's argument to use the absolute-conditional 
rule and affirmed a jury instruction to accept the secured party's excuse for 
debtor possession, if factually correct. Thereafter, Massachusetts followed the 
rebuttable rule, with only three relapses reverting to the absolute-conditional 
rule, resulting in secured party loses. 111 Other than these relapses, the secured 
sufficient to rebut presumption); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827) (instrument 
did not create a security interest); Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) 
(secured party took possession, then returned collateral). 
107. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 33-35 nn.l41-48 for the derivation 
from the sale of goods provision of the 1677 Statute of Frauds. All seaboard states properly 
followed this derivation as did Michigan and Illinois. /d. at 59 nn.240-41. Only Ohio and 
Indiana did not follow it. /d. at 59 nn.238, 240. 
108. For the earliest citations, see Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823) 
(citing Kidd v. Rawlinson,126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (K.B. 1800)); Bartlett v. Williams, 18 Mass. (I 
Pick.) 288 (1823) (citing Kidd); New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 
275 (1820)(citing Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, sub. nom. Chamberlain v. Twyne, 72 Eng. 
Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601)). 
109. 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808), see also Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 
661 ( 1808) (law of this state). 
110. Theophilus Parsons (1750-1813) of Newburyport, Essex County, served as Chief 
Justice (1806-1813). A.N. MARQUIS Co., WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, HISTORICAL VOLUME 
1607-1896 397 (1963). Samuel Sewall (1757-1814) of Marblehead, Essex County, served as 
U.S. Representative (1796-1800), Justice (1800-1813), and Chief Justice (1814). A.N. 
MARQUIS Co., supra, at 476. George Thatcher (1754-1824) of Biddeford, York County, (now 
Maine) served as U.S. Representative (1789-1801) and as Justice (1801-1824). 18 DUMAS 
MALONE, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 386 (1936). See WIWAMT. DAVIS, HISTORY 
OF THE JUDICIARY OF MASSACHUSETTS 178-79 (1971) (holders of office); DAVID HACKETT 
FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERAliST PARTY IN THE ERA 
OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 254-58 (1965) (Federalist party affiliation). 
Ill. For the relapses, see Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (follows 
Lanfear); Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 206 (1824) Gury instructed on absolute-conditional 
rule, appellate court avoids rule by treating transaction as a sale and resale); Lanfear v. Sumner, 
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party won twenty-four opinions and lost two under the rebuttable rule in 
Massachusetts. The losses involved documentation that failed to create the 
security interest or to uniquely identify the collateral. 
New York also obscured the source of, and policy behind, the rebuttable 
rule. Three New York Republicans, Smith Thompson of the Livingston 
faction, Ambrose Spencer of the Clinton faction and later an Antimason and 
a Whig, and Joseph Christopher Yates, and two Federalists, James Kent of the 
old-school, later a Whig, and William W. Van Ness of the new school, 
decided the 1810 per curiam Barrow v. Paxton112 opinion, New York's first 
nonpossessory secured transaction opinion. 113 The court rejected the argument 
to use the absolute-conditional rule to reverse an application of the rebuttable 
rule. The court cited an English marriage settlement opinion for the 
proposition, overlooking the secured party's argument formulated from 
Buller's treatise and an English non possessory secured transaction opinion. 114 
In the second case to provide a source for the rule, the chancery merely cited 
the general proposition that debtors have a right to prefer one creditor over 
another outside of bankruptcy.m Until 1829, New York followed the 
rebuttable rule, with only one foreshadowing of the heightened rebuttable 
17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (dealing with a Pennsylvania security interest void under per 
se rule in Pennsylvania). 
112. 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810)(citing Cadogan v. Kennet, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171 
(K.B. 1776), a marriage settlement opinion). 
113. Smith Thompson (1768-1843) of Amenia, Dutchess County, served as Justice 
(1802-1814), Chief Justice (1814-1818), Secretary of the Navy (1819-1823), and Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court (1824-1843). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 528. Ambrose 
Spencer (1765-1848) of Hudson, Columbia County, served as Justice (1804-1819), Chief 
Justice (1819-1823), and U.S. Representative (1829-1831). /d. at 498. Joseph Christopher 
Yates (1768-1837) of Schnectady, Schnectady County, served as Justice (1808-1822) and 
Governor (1823-1825). JAMES GRANT WILSON, 6 APPLETON'S CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 638 (6th ed. 1887). James Kent (1763-1847) of New York City served as Justice 
(1798-1804), Chief Justice (1804-1814), and Chancellor (1814-1823). A.N. MARQUIS Co., 
supra note 110, at 292. William W. Van Ness ( 1776-1823) of New York City served as Justice 
(1807-1822) and had banking connections. The legislature acquitted him in 1820 of using his 
office to obtain a bank charter. WILSON, supra, at 248. See FISCHER, supra note 110, at 302 
(Kent's party); id. at 318 (Van Ness's party); A.i..EXANDERFUCK, 6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK 57-58 (1934) (Yates's party); MALONE, supra note 110, at 444 (Spencer' s party, 
switched from Jacobin Federalists in 1798); id. at 471 (Thompson's party); HENRY ADAMS, 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 76 (1986) (Spencer's faction); WIWAM PRESTON VAUGHN, THE ANTIMASONIC 
PARTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1826-1842 at 43 (1982) (Kent, a Whig). 
114. For the formulation from Buller and Kidd, see Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 
9, at 49-50 nn.l94-96. 
115. See Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283, 306 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)(citing Hopkins 
v. Grey, 87 Eng. Rep. 1149 (K.B. 1704), a preference opinion). 
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rule. 116 Even with this foreshadowing, the secured party won eight opinions 
and lost one under the rebuttable rule in New York. The loss involved fraud 
pending a known judgment. 
In the other three seaboard states using the rebuttable rule, the secured 
party consistently won, winning twenty-one opinions and losing none. 
Republicans dominated the later seaboard state courts espousing the rebuttable 
rule for the first time. 
In New Hampshire, Republicans William Merchant Richardson, Samuel 
Bell, later a Whig, and Levi Woodbury, later a Democrat, rendered Haven v. 
Low, 117 written by Woodbury in 1819. 118 Woodbury drew New Hampshire's 
rule from the modem English rule. 
In New Jersey, moderate Federalist Andrew Kirkpatrick and 
Republicans, Samuel Lewis Southard, later a Whig, and William Rossell, later 
a National Republican, delivered Hendricks v. Mount, 119 written by Southard 
in 1820.120 Southard merely claimed it as undoubtedly correct. 
116. See Bisset v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (secured party victory). 
117. 2 N.H. 13, 17 (1819)(citing Kidd v. Rawlinson, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (K.B. 1800)). 
118. William Merchant Richardson (1774-1838) of Chester, Rockingham County, served 
as Republican U.S. Representative (1811-1814) for Massachusetts and Chief Justice (1816-
1838). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 442. Samuel Bell (1770-1850) of Francestown, 
Hillsborough County, served as Justice (1816-1819), Governor (1819-1823), and U.S. Senator 
(1 823-1835). /d. at 51. Levi Woodbury (1789-1851) of Portsmouth, Rockingham County, 
served asJustice(l817-1823), Governor(l823-1824), U.S. Senator(l825-1831 & 1841-1845), 
Secretary ofthe Navy (1831-1834), Secretary of the Treasury (1834-1841), and Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court (1845-1851). Id. at595. See Sen. Doc. No. 100-34, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess., 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OFTHE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989 (1989) (Richardson, 
Republican party, Bell eventually a Whig); DONALD B. COlE, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN NEW 
HAMPSHIRE, 1800-1851 36 (1970) (all three appointed by Isaac Hill). 
119. 5 N.J.L. 738 (1820). 
120. Andrew Kirkpatrick (1756-1831) of New Brunswick, Middlesex County, served as 
Justice ( 1798-1804) and ChiefJustice (1804-1824). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 296. 
Samuel Lewis Southard (1787 -1842) ofHunterdon County served as Justice (1815-1820), U.S. 
Senator (1821-1823 & 1833-1842), Secretary of the Navy (1823-1829), Secretary of the 
Treasury (1825), Secretary of War (1828), and Governor (1832-1833). /d. at 496. William 
Rossell (1760-1840) of Monmouth County served as Justice (1804-1826) and Federal District 
Judge (1826-1840). BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES 428 (2d ed. 1983). See MALONE, supra note 110, at 
412 (Southard party eventually a Whig); CARL E. PRINCE, NEW JERSEY JEFFERSONIAN 
REPUBUCANS: THEGENESISOFANEARLYPARTYMACHINE 1789-1817 36 (1964) (Kirkpatrick's 
party); id. at 92 (Rossell's party). 
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In Maine, Republicans William Pitt Preble, and Nathan Weston, Jr., later 
a Democrat, and Federalist Prentiss Mellen, decided Haskell v. Greely, 121 
written by Mellen in 1825 from Massachusetts opinions. 122 
Democrats dominated the courts adopting the rebuttable rule after 1832. 
In Ohio, an evenly balanced court under Whig Peter Hitchcock and Democrat 
John Crafts Wright rendered the Rogers v. Dare123 opinion in 1832 without 
support. 124 
Democrats Epaphroditus Ransom, Charles Wiley Whipple, Alpheus 
Felch, and Daniel Goodwin rendered the Jackson v. Dean125 opinion written 
by Ransom in 1845 from New York opinions. 126 
But, Republican dominated courts also rendered the opinions espousing 
the heightened rebuttable rule, a rule that in practice destroyed the 
nonpossessory secured transaction. In Connecticut, Republicans Stephen 
Titus Hosmer, John Thompson Peters, Jeremiah Gates Brainerd, and William 
121. 3 Me. 425,427 (l825)(citing Badlam v. Tucker,l8 Mass. (l Pick.) 389 (1823) and 
Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (ll Tyng) 300 (1815)). 
122. William Pitt Preble (1785-1857) of York, York County, served as Justice (1820-
1828) and as a president of a railroad company (1845-1848). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 
110, at 423. Nathan Weston, Jr., (1782-1859) of Augusta, Kennebec County, served as Justice 
(1820-1834) and Chief Justice (1834-1841). 7 JAMES T. WHITE & Co., THE NATIONAL 
CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 503 ( 1897). Prentiss Mellen ( 1764-1840) of Portland, 
Cumberland County, served as U.S. Senator (1818-1820) for Massachusetts and Chief Justice 
(1820-1834). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 423. Mellen also incorporated Maine's 
first savings bank in 1819 with no restrictions on investments and served as its president. 
WilliAM CHADBOURNE, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN MAINE 1799-1930 118-119 ( 1936). See 
MALONE, supra note 110, at 184 (Preble switched to Republican in 1814); RONALD F. BANKS, 
MAINEBECOMESASTATE:THEMOVEMENTTOSEPARATEMAINEFROMMASSACHUSETTS 1785-
1820 185 (1970) (Mellen, a Federalist in 1819). 
123. Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832). 
124. John Crafts Wright (1783-1861) of Steubenville, Jefferson County, served as 
Republican, later Democrat, U.S. Congressman (1823-1829) and as Justice (1831-1835). See 
A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 598. Peter Hitchcock (1781-1854) of Burton, Geauga 
County, served as Republican U.S. Congressman (1817-1819) and as Justice (1819-1832 & 
1845-1852). /d. at 253; MALONE, supra note 110, at 77 (Hitchock, a Republican eventually a 
Whig). 
125. 1 Doug. 519, 524 (Mich. 1845) (citing two post-chattel mortgage acts cases from 
N.Y.). 
126. Epaphroditus Ransom ( 1797 -1859) of Kalamazoo, Kalamazoo County, served as 
Justice (1836-1843), as ChiefJustice(l843-1847), and asGovernor(l847-1849). See CHARLES 
LANMAN, BIOGRAPfDCAL ANNALS OF THE CIVn. GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DURING 
ITS FIRST CENTURY 350 (1876); F. CLEVER BALD, MICfDGAN IN FOUR CENTURIES 253 (1961 ). 
Charles Wiley Whipple (1805-1856) served as Justice to 1856. 4 Mich. iii (1857) (death of 
Whipple). Alpheus Felch (1804-1896) of Monroe, Monroe County, served as Justice (1843-
1845), Governor (1846-1847), and Democrat Senator (1846-1852). See A.N. MARQUIS Co., 
supra note llO, at 177. Daniel Goodwin (1799-1887) served as Justice (1843-1850). See 
WILSON, supra note 113, at 682. 
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Bristol delivered Patten v. Smith, 121 written by Hosmer in 1824 and adopting 
the heightened rebuttable rule. 128 But a non possessory secured transaction 
alone did not satisfy the special reason exception. Hosmer found support for 
the new rule in an English bankruptcy opinion, cited as if it were a decision 
under the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute. So the secured parties 
suffered three defeats. 129 
Like Massachusetts, New York did not always follow the rebuttable rule, 
but unlike Massachusetts, New York's uneasiness did not entail a desire to 
return to the absolute-conditional rule, a rule that allowed the nonpossessory 
secured transaction under certain formalities. Republicans John Savage, later 
a Democrat, Jacob Sutherland, and William Learned Marcy, later a Democrat, 
rendered Divver v. McLaughlin, 130 written by Savage in 1829 and adopting the 
heightened rebuttable rule, allowing for the possibility of an appellate court 
to find fraud without a jury. 131 The legislature had earlier enshrined the 
127. 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (citing Ryall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107, sub. nom. Ryall v. 
Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Ch. 1749)). 
128. Stephen Titus Hosmer (1763-1834) of Middletown, Middlesex County, served as 
Justice (1815-1819) and Chief Justice (1819-1833). WILSON, supra note 113, at 269. John 
Thompson Peters (1765-1834) of Hebron, Tolland County, served as Justice (1818-1834). /d. 
at 743; LANMAN, supra note 126, at 331. Jeremiah Gates Brainerd served as Justice from 
(1818-1824). William Bristol (1779-1836) of New Haven, New Haven County, served as 
Justice (1819-1826) and Federal District Judge (1826-1836). BICENTENNIAL COMMmEE OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 120, at 56 (Bristol later a Whig). 
Federalist Asa Chapman, Justice (1818-1825), did not participate in the opinion. Patten v. 
Smith, 5 Conn. 196, 202. See 2 Conn. vii (1820) (Chapman); 6 Conn. iii (1829) (Chapman); 
7 Conn. iii (1831) (Brainerd); RICHARD]. PURCElL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION, 1775-1818 
239 (1963) (Bristol republican party); id. at 251 (Hosmer and Brainerd only ones of a two-thirds 
Federalist dominated court to avoid Republican purge of four Federalists in 1818). 
129. For secured party defeats with debtor's possession condition in the supplemental 
document, see Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824). For secured party defeats with debtor's 
possession condition absent, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832); Swift v. Thompson, 9 
Conn. 63 (1831) (establishing that a nonpossessory secured transaction without more fails to 
satisfy the heightened rebuttable rule). 
130. 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (citing Savage's earlier opinion Bisset; secured 
party defeat); accord Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (pre-
statutory secured party victory since no fraud in law); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1832) (pre-statutory secured party victory); McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1829) (secured party defeat); see also Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) 
(secured party victory). The same justices decided Bisset as Divver, except John Woodworth, 
a Clintonian, preceded Marcy. John Woodworth (1768-1858) of Albany, Albany County, 
served as Justice (1819-1828). WILSON, supra note 113, at 608; 2 J. HAMPDEN DOUGHERTY, 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 73 (1983) (Woodworth, a Clintonian). 
131. John Savage (1779-1863) of Salem, Washington County, served as U.S. 
Representative (1815-1819) and Chief Justice (1823-1836). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 
II 0, at 456. Jacob Sutherland served as Justice ( 1823-1836). William Learned Marcy (1786-
1857) of Troy, Rensselaer County, served as Justice (1829-1831), U.S. Senator (1831-1833), 
Governor of New York (1833-1839), Secretary of War (1845-1849), and Secretary of State 
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rebuttable rule in statute, requiring a jury to consider the matter of fraud. 132 
The New York courts, however, remained hostile. They interpreted the statute 
to require the secured party to negative fraud. 133 Under the tougher New York 
rebuttable rule, the secured party won six opinions and lost nine. The losses 
involved documentation that failed to create the security interest or various 
allegedly fraudulent practices such as keeping the security interest secret, 
transferring collateral worth several times the debt, slow delivery, 
enforcement after the debt's payoff, and fraud pending judgment. But the 
losses also included three opinions involving debtor possession solely to work 
off the loan. 134 
In Vermont Republicans, Samuel Prentiss, later a Whig, Titus 
Hutchinson, Charles Kilbourne Williams, later Whig, and Stephen Royce, Jr., 
later a Whig and Republican, and National Republican Ephraim Paddock, 
(1853-1857). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 332. Marcy's father-in-law, Benjamin 
Knower, co-founded the Albany Regency and served as president of the Albany Regency's bank 
in Albany, the Manufacturer's and Farmer's Bank of Albany. LEE BENSON, THE CONCEPT OF 
JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK AS A TEsT CASE 66-67 (1961). See Sen. Doc. No. 100-
34, supra note 118 (Savage, later a Democrat); 7 N.Y.R. 414 (1884) (Sutherland appointed 
1823); 12 N.Y.R. ii (1884) (Sutherland resigned 1835). 
132. For the statute, see 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat., c. 7, tit. 2 § 5 (1829). The statute reads: 
Every sale made by a vendor of goods and chattels in his possession, or 
under his control, and every assignment of goods and chattels by way of 
mortgage or security, or upon any condition whatever, unless the same be 
accompanied by a immediate delivery, and be followed by an actual and 
continued change of possession of the things sold, mortgaged or assigned, 
shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void, as against the creditors of 
the vendor, or the creditors of the person making such assignment, or 
subsequent purchasers in good faith; and shall be made to appear on the 
part of the persons claiming under such sale or assignment, that the same 
was made in good faith, and without any intent to defraud such creditors 
or purchasers. 
The legislature first passed this statute as part of the revised statutes of 1830. See 2 SAMUEL 
WILUSTON, LAW GoVERNING SALES OF GooDS 451-52 (1948). The revisers desired a return to 
the old fraudulent conveyance statute they claimed required delivery for a mortgage challenged 
by a creditor; however, the legislature changed the language to provide the good faith exception. 
See Smith v. Acker 23 Wend. 653, 673-74 (N.Y. 1840) (Sen. Verplanck). 
This statute meant that the secured party must negative the fraudulent presumption by more 
than just the documentation creating the security interest, with fraud determined by a jury. 
Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834), Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Murray v. Buttis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836). 
133. See Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (secured party loss); 
accord Randall v. Cook,17Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (securedparty1oss); Doanev. Eddy, 
16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (secured party loss); Murray v. Burtis,l5 Wend. 212 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1836) (secured party loss); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (secured 
party victory). 
134. See, e.g., Randall v. Cook, 17 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Doane v. Eddy, 16 
Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Gardnerv. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
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decided the 1830 per curiam Tobias v. Francis135 opinion, adopting the 
heightened rebuttable rule. 136 Three secured party losses followed. 137 
A Republican court rendered the one per se fraud opinion. Pennsylvania 
differed from the other northern states in that it had adopted a bankruptcy law 
in 1785 for seven years similar to the English bankruptcy law, including the 
reputed ownership clause. 138 So when confronted with a nonpossessory 
secured transaction in the form of a chattel mortgage, Republicans John 
Bannister Gibson, later a Jacksonian Democrat, and Thomas Duncan 
(concurring opinion) preferred the per se fraud rule applicable to the reputed 
ownership clause, rejecting both the absolute-conditional rule and the 
rebuttable rule, in Clow v. Woods! 39 written by Gibson in 1819}40 Gibson 
found support in an English bankruptcy opinion cited as if it were a decision 
under the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute rather than the reputed 
ownership clause of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1624. Gibsonrejected the 
English view of incorporating merchant customs as the common law since he 
135. 3 Vt. 425 (1830). 
136. Samuel Prentiss (1782-1857) of Montpelier, Washington County, served as Chief 
Justice (1825-1829) and U.S. Senator (1831-1842). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 423 
(Prentiss later a Whig). Titus Hutchinson ( 1771-1857) ofW oodstock, Windsor County, served 
as Justice (1826-1830) and Chief Justice (1830-1833). 4JAMEST. WHITE & CO., THE NATIONAL 
CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 442 (1924). Charles Kilbourne Williams (1782-1853) 
of Rutland, Rutland County, served as Justice (1822-1824 & 1829-1842), Chief Justice (1842-
1846), and Governor (1850-1852). WILSON, supra note 113, at 525. Stephen Royce, Jr. (1789-
1868) of St. Albans, Franklin County, served as Justice (1825-1827 & 1829-1846), Chief 
Justice (1 846-1852), and Governor (1854-1856). WILSON, supra note 113, at 340. Ephraim 
Paddock served as Justice (1828-1831). See ROSSITER JOHNSON, TwENTIETH CENTURY 
BIOGRAPHICALDICTIONARYOFNOTABLEAMERICANS (1904) (Hutchinson and Royce); FiSCHER, 
supra note 110, at 245 (Prentiss, a Federalist); 2 Vt. iii (1830) (Paddock); 4 Vt. iii (1833) 
(Paddock); RANDOLPH A. ROTH, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: REUGION, REroRM, AND THE 
SOCIAL ORDER IN THE CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY OF VERMONT 1791-1850 103 {1987) 
(Hutchinson, a Republican in 1818); ROBERT VEXLER, CHRONOLOGY AND DOCUMENTARY 
HANDBOOK OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 8 (1979) (Williams and Royce, Whig governors; Royce 
later a Republican). 
137. For secured party defeats with debtor's possession condition in the primary 
document, see Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433 (1839); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837); 
Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830). 
138. For a discussion of the reputed ownership clause, see Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra 
note 9, at 40-41 n.l72. 
139. 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819)(citingRyall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107, sub. 
nom. Ryall v. Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Ch. 1749)). 
140. John Bannister Gibson (1780-1853) of Carlisle, Cumberland County, served as 
Justice (1816-1827 & 1851-1853) and Chief Justice (1827-1851). A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra 
note 110, at 203. Thomas Duncan (1760-1827) of Carlisle, Cumberland County, served as 
Justice (1817-1827). WHITE, supra note 122, at 298 (Duncan appointed by GovernorSnyder). 
Federalist William Tilghman (1756-1827) of Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, Chief Justice 
(1806-1827), did not participate in the opinion. A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 203. 
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saw widely diverse commercial practices and instead adopted principles to 
reduce litigation. 141 The per se fraud rule did just that. However, some 
Pennsylvanian parties found the per se fraud rule undesirable as denying 
security and experimented after 1819 with various other security devices, such 
as the conditional bill of sale and the sale and resale to create the 
nonpossessory secured transaction in Pennsylvania before hitting upon the 
bailment lease.142 The Pennsylvania courts enforced bailment leases. 
Whigs and Democrats each dominated one of the courts adopting the 
absolute-conditional rule. In Indiana, Democrats Isaac Newton Blackford, 
Stephen C. Stevens, and John T. M'Kinney delivered the Jordan v. Tumer143 
opinion written by Stevens in 1833.144 Adhering to the early common law, 
they couched their opinion in language more appropriate for the rebuttable 
rule but admitted only explanatory evidence consistent with the terms of the 
primary written documentation for the nonpossessory secured transaction. 
The results complied with those obtainable under the absolute-conditional 
rule.t4s 
In lllinois, Whigs William Wilson, Samuel Drake Lockwood 
(dissenting), and Thomas C. Browne and Democrat Theophilus Washington 
Smith rendered the Thornton v. Davenporr46 opinion written by Wilson in 
141. BERNARDSWARTZ,MAINCURRENTIN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 211 (1993). 
142. For secured party defeats with debtor's possession condition in the primary 
document, see Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (sale and resale); Martin 
v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (conditional sale); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. 
(5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) (chattel mortgage). For secured party defeat with debtor's 
possession condition possibly in the supplemental document, see Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. 
(12 Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824) (deed). For secured party defeat with debtor's possession 
condition absent, see Welsh v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (l Pen. & W.) 57 (1829) (articles of agreement). 
For secured party victories with debtor's possession condition in the primary document of a 
bailment lease, see Clark v. Jack, 47 Pa. (7 Watts) 375 (1838); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. 
& W.) 478 (1831). 
143. 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833). 
144. Isaac Newton Blackford (1786-1859) ofVincinnes, Knox County, served as Justice 
(1819-1835). See WU..SON,supranote 113, at273; BICENTENNIALCOMMfiTEEOFTHEJUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 120, at 39. Stephen C. Stevens served as 
Justice (1831-1836). See 2 Blackf. v. (Ind.); 4 Blackf. v. (Ind.) (same). John T. M'Kinney 
served as Justice (1831-1837). See 2 Blackf. v. (Ind.); 4 Blackf. v. (Ind.) (same). 
145. For secured party victory with debtor's possession condition in the primary 
document, see Hankins v. Ingots, 4 Blackf. 35 (Ind. 1835) (upholding trial court's rebuttable 
rule in jury instructions). For secured party victory with debtor's possession condition absent, 
see Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 1835) (mortgage lacks possession condition, so 
explanatory evidence wrongly excluded since it can not be inconsistent). For secured party 
defeat with debtor's possession condition absent, see Jordan v. Turner, 3 Black£. 309 (Ind. 
1833) (debtor possession inconsistent with mortgage, unexplained, is fraud ; but evidence not 
consistent with mortgage excluded). 
146. 2 Ill. (l Scam.) 296 (1836). 
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1836.147 These judges rejected the per se fraud rule and emphatically adhered 
to the absolute-conditional rule, citing two irrelevant cases, an English 
marriage settlement case and a Virginia recorded mortgage case. Mixed 
decisions resulted as some attorneys tried to advance a contrary rule on behalf 
of their client to replace the absolute-conditional rule.148 
So the courts adopting the various rules did not reveal the policy 
considerations behind them, nor indicate which groups favored which rule. 
Party affiliation also did not separate the courts adopting a particular rule. 
ill. PROPONENTS BEHIND THE RULES 
To determine the groups favoring the status quo, those favoring the 
validity of the nonpossessory secured transaction, and those opposing it 
required determining the lending practices of the various groups of creditors 
and matching that with the various legal rules. To determine the lending 
practices of the major pre-chattel mortgage act lenders involved examination 
of the secured party groups and the corresponding debtor groups for whether 
the parties used primary documentation in absolute or conditional form and 
whether they created security interests orally. 
Only three categories of lenders required consideration. The rebuttable 
rule favored those secured parties that both lacked adequate title 
documentation of the security interest, either with an absolute form or oral 
creation, and only occasionally entered into a nonpossessory secured 
transaction thereby avoiding much litigation under the rebuttable rule to 
147. William Wilson (1794-1857) of White County served as Justice (1818-1824) and 
as Chief Justice ( 1824-1848). See MALONE, supra note 110, at 34 7 (Wilson became a Democrat 
upon the demise of the Whigs). Samuel Drake Lockwood (1789-1874) of Batavia, Kane 
County, served as Justice (1825-1848). See A.N. MARQUIS Co., supra note 110, at 319 
(Lockwood later a Republican). Theophilus Washington Smith (1784-1846) of Chicago, Cook 
County, served as Justice (1825-1842). See WILSON, supra note 113, at 590. Thomas C. 
Browne served as Justice (1818-1847). See also THOMAS FORD, A HISTORY OF IlliNOIS FROM 
IT COMMENCEMENT AS A STATE IN 1818 TO 1847 328 (1945) (in 1840 all were Whigs except 
Smith). 
148. For secured party victory with debtor's possession condition in the primary 
document, see Letcher v. Norton, 5 Ill. (4 Scam) 575 (1843); Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. (I 
Scam.) 296 (1836)(citing Cadogan v. Kennet, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171 (K.B. 1776), and Clayborn's 
Executor v. Hill, 1 Va. (I Wash.) 177 (1793)). For secured party defeat with debtor's 
possession condition in primary document, see Rhines v. Phelps, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 455 (1846) 
(becomes absolute after expiration of security interest); Morris v. Grover, 2 Ill. (I Scam.) 528 
( 1840) (decided on procedural grounds so never confronted the proper rule; appears to use rule: 
first of two creditors to gain possession has priority). For secured party victory with debtor's 
possession condition absent, see Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 Ill. (I Scam.) 300 (1836) (retrial granted 
to determine who had possession of the collateral). For the advocacy of the per se fraud rule, 
see Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. (I Scam.) 296 (1836) (Lockwood, J., dissenting). 
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enforce their rights. This group would prefer the status quo. The other two 
groups of lenders encountered difficulty under the rebuttable rule due to its 
determination by litigation. Those lending groups that ordinarily used proper 
documentation would desire a black and white rule, such as the absolute-
conditional rule, to end litigation under the rebuttable rule to enforce their 
interests. In contrast, those groups that failed to take a non possessory secured 
transaction and lost under the rebuttable rule to a secured party would prefer 
an insolvency, pro rata distribution rule and an elimination of litigation by 
voiding all non possessory security interests. This group would desire the per 
se fraud rule or the heightened rebuttable rule. 
Of the eighty-nine opinions identifying the secured party, only seven did 
not also identify the debtor. But identification of the collateral provided an 
inference as to the debtor's identification. Each of these unidentified cases 
involved livestock indicating the debtor as a farmer. 
These eighty-nine opinions dealt with five debtor groups: thirty-one 
shippers, namely twenty-nine shipowners and two cargo owners, nineteen 
farmers, nineteen manufacturers, eleven retailers (including the five publishers 
and transporters), and nine traders, namely seven wholesalers and two jobbers. 
These same opinions involved seven secured party groups: twenty-one 
endorsers, twenty traders, thirteen farmers, thirteen manufacturers, nine 
financial institutions, namely four banks and five insurers, eight shippers (all 
shipowners), and five retailers. 
A. TRADERS REQUIRED THE REBUTTABLE RULE 
Examination of the loans to the five debtor groups revealed that loan 
documentation for loans to traders and retailers involved by far the least care. 
These two groups risked losing their credit without the rebuttable rule. 
For loans to traders secured parties drafted fifty-five percent of the 
security interests in absolute form and thirty-three percent involved a security 
interest created orally .149 For loans to retailers, secured parties composed 
149. From the endorser, see Ward v. Summer, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827) (trading 
firm). From traders, see Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (I 827) (absolute, oral; gin 
jobber); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821) (absolute; navy contractor-jobber); 
Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (absolute, oral; consignee); Levy v. Welsh, 
2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (trading firm); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847) 
(merchant partner). From the farmer, see Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) (trading firm). 
From the bank, see New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820) 
(absolute, oral; shareholder). From the retailer, see Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1821) (absolute; trading firm). 
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thirty-six percent of the security interests in absolute form and nine percent 
concerned a security interest created orally .150 
In contrast, loans made to the other groups reflected much more careful 
documentation, but with no group standing out. Of the shipping loans, 
secured parties crafted nineteen percent of the security interests in absolute 
form and sixteen percent referred to a security interest created orally .151 For 
loans to the farmers, the secured parties made twenty-one percent of the 
security interests in absolute form and eleven percent related to a security 
interest created orally. 152 For loans to the manufacturers, the secured parties 
150. From endorsers, see Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (absolute); Divver v. 
McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.l829); Wellerv. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1819) (absolute). From traders, see Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841); Hunt v. Holton, 30 
Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 (1832). From the farmer, see Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & 
Rawle) 214 (1826). From the manufacturer, see Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824). From 
retailers, see Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (absolute, oral); Jackson v. Dean, 
1 Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (absolute); 
Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
151. From endorsers, see Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. (2 
Pick.) 249 (1824) (absolute); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823); Putnam v. 
Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811); M'lntyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) 
(absolute, oral); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811). From traders, see Harris v. 
D' Wolf, 29 U.S . (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (New York law); Hurry v. The John and Alice, 12 F. Cas. 
1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 6,923), on retrial, Hurry v. Hurry' s Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922); Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 (Adm. Ct. D. Pa. 1786) 
(No. 4,925); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 
(16 Tyng) 606 (1822); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808) (absolute, oral); Ring 
v. Franklin, 2 Hall 1 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (absolute, oral); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. 
Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822); Jennings v. 
Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 244 (1811); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 
Yeates) 3 (1791). From financial institutions, see Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 
386 (1828) (New York law); Franklin Ins. Co. v. Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 
5,057); United States v. Delaware Ins. Co., 25 F. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942); 
Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 (1810); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 
Tyng) 661 (1808); Delaware Ins. Co. v. Archer, 35 Pa. (3 Rawle) 216 (1832); Insurance Co. of 
Pa. v. Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822). From ship sellers, see Philips v. Led ley, 19 
F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11 ,096); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832); Thorndike v. 
Stone, 28 Mass. (1 1 Pick.) 183 (1831) (absolute, oral); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1827); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); Kellogg v. Brennan, 
14 Ohio 72 (1846). From cargo shippers, see The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) 
(No. 9,187); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (absolute, oral). 
152. From endorsers, see Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 557 (1832); Doane v. 
Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1864); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Bailey v. Burton, 
8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847); Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 
555 (1830) (absolute). From the trader, see Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1836). From farmers, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832); Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 
(1841); Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (absolute); 
Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832) (absolute, oral); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 
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obtained twenty-one percent of the security interests in absolute form and 
eleven percent comprised a security interest created orally .153 
Of the two less precise groups of debtors, the traders, selling in larger 
lots, dealt with the fewer transactions. So traders, to protect their secured 
borrowing, needed the rebuttable rule to enforce their secured party's 
nonpossessory secured transaction as intended. In contrast retailers, as 
victims of the traders' secured party, probably would lean towards the per se 
fraud rule. 
B. MANUFACfURERS RISKED LOSS UNDER THE REBUTTABLE RULE 
Examination of the loans made by the various secured party groups 
revealed that only manufacturers and institutional lenders prepared loan 
documentation carefully. They risked losing their non possessory secured 
transaction under the rebuttable rule. 
For loans made by manufacturers fifteen percent of the security interests 
appeared in absolute form and eight percent involved a security interest 
created orally. 154 Almost all of this secured lending involved the sale of the 
factory and equipment or just the equipment. So manufacturers, both as 
borrowers against their equipment and as sellers of their manufactured 
equipment, took care. 
(1833) (absolute, oral); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827); Myers v. Harvey, 
39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837); Atwater v. Mower, 10 
Vt. 75 (1838); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 (Vt. 1826). 
153. From endorsers, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831); Haskell v. Greely, 3 
Me. 425 (1825); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (II Tyng) 300 (1815) (absolute, oral); Passmore 
v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824) (absolute); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. 
& Rawle) 275 (1819). From the trader, see Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 
(1835). From manufacturer sellers, see Wilbur v. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1851); Reed 
v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) (absolute, oral); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 
(1833); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 
Pick.) 522 (1830); Flagg v. Dryden, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 52 (1828); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 
Pick.) 71 (1827); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824); Gale v. Ward,14 Mass. 
(13 Tyng) 352 (1817); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Rogers v. Dare, 
Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) (absolute); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830). From 
the bank, see Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831). 
154. To manufacturers, see Wilbur v. Almy, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1851); Reed v. 
Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827) (absolute, oral); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833); 
Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 213 (1832); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 522 
(1830); Flagg v. Dryden, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 52 (1828); Ayer v. Bartlett, 23 Mass. (7 Pick.) 71 
(1827); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 512 (1824) (sale of wool); Gale v. Ward, 14 
Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817); Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Rogers v. 
Dare, Wright 136 (Guernsey County Ct. 1832) (absolute); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 (1830). 
To retailers, see Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824). 
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For loans made by financial institutions, eleven percent of the security 
interests possessed an absolute form, and eleven percent treated a security 
interest created orally.m Almost all of these secured lendings pertained to 
shippers. 
In contrast, the other groups made less carefully documented loans. For 
loans made by retailers, sixty percent of the security interests had an absolute 
form and twenty percent dealt with a security interest created orally .156 For 
loans made by endorsers, thirty-three percent of the security interests involved 
the absolute form and ten percent comprised a security interest created 
orally. 157 Farmers, shippers, and manufacturers dominated the debtor groups 
borrowing through endorsements. For loans made by shipowners, all shipping 
loans in rebuttable states, twenty-five percent of the security interests 
concerned the absolute form and twenty-five percent treated a security interest 
created orally.158 For loans made by traders, twenty-five percent of the 
security interests related to the absolute form and twenty percent referred to 
155. To the manufacturer, see Brinley v. Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831). To shippers, see 
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (New York law); Franklin Ins. Co. v. 
Lord, 9 F. Cas. 712 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5,057); United States v. Delaware Ins. Co., 25 
F. Cas. 81 I (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 14,942); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 422 
(1810); Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808); Delaware Ins. Co. v. Archer, 35 
Pa. (3 Raw1e) 216 (1832); Insurance Co. ofPa. v. Duval, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 138 (1822). 
To the trader, see New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 275 (1820). 
156. To retailers, see Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 56 (1828) (absolute, oral); 
Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845); Bissel v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1824) (absolute); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). To the trader, see 
Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (absolute). 
157. To manufacturers, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831); Haskell v. Greely, 
3 Me. 425 (1825); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 300 (1815) (absolute, oral); Passmore 
v. Eldridge, 27 Pa. (12 Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824) (absolute); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. 
& Rawle) 275 (1819). To shippers, see Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 
Mass. (2 Pick.) 249 (1824) (absolute); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 389 (1823); 
Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811); M'Intyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1811) (absolute, oral); Dawes v. Cope, 13 Pa. (4 Binn.) 258 (1811). To retailers, see Bartels 
v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (absolute); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1829); Weller v. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (absolute). To the trader, see 
Ward v. Summer, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827). To farmers, see Johns v. Church, 29 Mass. (12 
Pick.) 557 (1832); Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Patchin v. Pierce, 12 
Wend. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1832); Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 339 (N.Y. 1831); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847); 
Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555 (1830) (absolute). 
158. To shippers, see The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938 (C.C.D. Conn. 1824) (No. 9,187); 
Philips v. Ledley, 19 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 11,096); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 
(1832) (absolute, oral); Thorndike v. Stone, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 183 (1831); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 
Wend. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (absolute, oral); Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1827); Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14 
Ohio 72 (1846). 
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a security interest created orally.159 For loans made by farmers, twenty-three 
percent of the security interests appeared in absolute form and fifteen percent 
comprised a security interest created orally. 160 
Although manufacturing lenders and institutional lenders both used 
accurate documentation, the manufacturers became the more adamant group. 
They attempted early to avoid the rebuttable rule's effects by using real estate 
mortgages; 161 hoping the legal rules of realty would protect the non possessory 
secured transaction for factory machinery. But fixture law failed to consider 
machinery as a part of the real estate. 162 
159. To the manufacturer, see Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835). To 
traders, see Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (New York law); Hurry v. The John 
and Alice, 12 F. Cas. 1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 6,923), on retrial, Hurry v. Hurry's 
Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 6,922); Forbes v. The Hannah, 9 F. Cas. 406 
(Adm. Ct. D. Pa. 1786) (No. 4,925); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826); Marston 
v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 606 (1822); Hussey v. Thornton,4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 405 (1808) 
(absolute, oral); Ring v. Franklin, 2 Hall! (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (absolute, oral); Hendricks 
v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio 547 (1847); Fisher 
v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) ll8 (1822); Jennings v. Insurance Co. ofPa., 13 Pa. (4 
Binn.) 244 (1811); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 3 (1791). To retailers, see 
Smith v. Putney,l8 Me. 87 (1841); Hunt v. Holton, 30Mass. (13 Pick.) 216 (1832). To traders, 
see Whitwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 449 (1827) (absolute, oral); Rice v. Austin, 17 
Mass. (16 Tyng) 197 (1821) (absolute); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) 
(absolute, oral); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 438 (N.Y. Ch. 1835). To the farmer, see Look v. 
Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (expartner). 
160. To the retailer, see Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826). To 
the trader, see Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836). To farmers, see Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 
(1832); Ripley v. Dolbier, 18 Me. 382 (1841); Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838); Tibbetts v. 
Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (absolute); Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832) (absolute, oral); 
Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 464 (1833) (absolute, oral); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 
Mass. (5 Pick.) 522 (1827); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831); Woodward v. 
Gates, 9 Vt. 358 (1837); Atwater v. Mower, 10 Vt. 75 (1838); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115 
(Vt. 1826). 
161. See Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (real estate mortgage for farm produce); 
Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (real estate deed for textile machinery); Gale v. Ward, 
14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) (real estate mortgage for textile machinery); Sturgis v. Warren, 
11 Vt. 433 (1839) (real estate mortgage for textile machinery); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 
(1830) (real estate mortgage for textile machinery). 
162. See Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (textile machinery standing, cleated, and 
nailed to floor deemed personalty for debtor's general creditor suing mortgagee); see also Taffe 
v. Warnick, 3 Blackf. Ill (Ind. 1832) (carding machine standing on floor is personalty for 
creditor suing debtor); Union Bank v. Emerson, 15 Mass. 159 ( 1818) (kettle in fulling-mill used 
for dying cloth, was set in brick so creditor could not remove it without injury, considered a 
fixture for mortgagee suing mortgagor's buyer); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 352 (1817) 
(carding machines standing and later nailed to floor judged personalty for judgment lienholder 
suing sherift); Raymond v. White, 7 Cow. 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (tanner's vats and leaches 
attached by board tacked with nails considered personalty for mortgagee's buyer suingjudgment 
lienholder); Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (carding machines cleated to 
floor amounted to personalty for mortgagee suing judgment lienholder); Heermance v. Vernoy, 
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In contrast, financial institutions generally lent through endorsements 
and deeds of trust with the trustee taking possession. 163 If a debtor became 
insolvent the financial institution could recover from the endorser. Moreover, 
the major financial institutions risking loss under the rebuttable rule 
comprised those making shipping loans to commercial merchants. The 
commercial merchant borrowing through such loans had earlier led to the 
adoption of the rebuttable rule. 164 Most of the early opinions replacing the 
absolute-conditional rule involved loans to commercial merchants, such as 
shippers. Besides, they had the benefit of an exception to the rebuttable rule 
for taking possession upon the ship's return. 165 
C. RETAILERS FAVOR THE PER SE FRAUD RULE 
During the pre-chattel mortgage act era, both Connecticut and New York 
used the heightened rebuttable rule, which for Connecticut operated as a per 
se fraud rule. So there existed significant opposition to recognizing the effect 
of nonpossessory secured transactions. 
The identities of the groups who opposed the use of nonpossessory 
secured transactions are not readily apparent in the pre-chattel mortgage act 
opinions. Those opinions do reveal retailers as the most likely to poorly 
document their nonpossessory secured transactions. These retailers entered 
numerous sales transactions on credit and thus probably favored the per se 
fraud rule. 
6 Johns. 5 (1810) (tanner's grinding stone attached by bolted iron bands taken for personalty 
for vendee suing vendor); Teaffv. Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511 (1853) (cleated wool manufacturing 
machinery was personalty for mortgagee suing debtor's judgment lienholder); Sturgis v. Warren, 
II Vt. 433 (1839) (wool manufacturing machinery attached by cleats, screws, and nails held 
personalty for secured party's assignee suing deputy sherifO; Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 
( 1830) (carding machine connected by band for propulsion deemed personalty for secured party 
suing execution official). 
163. For endorsements, see supra note 52 and accompanying text. For deeds of trust, 
see New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. ( 16 Tyng) 275 (1820) (banks normally 
lent by deeds of trust). 
164. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 35-36 nn.l52-57. 
165. See Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 286 (1811) (intended to take possession in 
home port, not a neighboring Massachusetts port); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 
422 (1810) (expected to take possession a reasonable time after learning of arrival); Portland 
Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 661 (1808) (took possession as soon as learned of arrival); 
Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (took possession of ships on arrival 
in New York). See also Harris v. D'Wolf, 29 U.S.(4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (cargo on ship at sea, 
levied upon landing); Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (same); Lanfear 
v. Sumner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 110 (1821) (attempted to take possession within one hour of 
arrival); Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 495 (1826) (cargo on ship at sea, sold overseas). 
Pennsylvania did not use the rebuttable rule, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text, 
and so Pennsylvania supplied no at sea exception opinions. 
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Clearly, the general creditors with judgment liens losing to the security 
interest would favor the per se fraud rule. But their stand-in for most of the 
actions, the sheriff who levied their lien, obscured their identity. Few of the 
eighty-nine opinions specifying both the secured party's and the debtor's 
occupation mentioned the grouping of the general creditor. And of the forty-
eight opinions identifying the general creditor, too few helped. After 
eliminating the shipping opinions, since many early chattel mortgage statutes 
exempted these situations, only nineteen opinions remained. Most of these 
dealt with loans to shipowners or retailers. 
But the clue to their identity appeared in the first New York post-chattel 
mortgage act opinion. This opinion clearly stated that the problem of good 
faith purchasers of the collateral losing to the secured party concerned the 
Justices. 166 Subsequent opinions usually phrased the objection to the security 
interest in terms of the debtor granting the interest immediately before 
insolvency proceedings to a friend or relative with a view to prevent the 
execution of a judgment lien but retaining the possession of the collateral. 167 
Thereby both the friend and the judgment lienholder received nothing while 
the debtor enjoyed the collateral. 168 But of the nineteen pre-chattel mortgage 
opinions that identify both the secured party and the general creditor and do 
not involve shipping, the New York opinions seldom had a judgment 
lienholder as the general creditor. 169 Instead they involved a good faith 
166. See Wood v. Lowry, 17Wend. 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)(Bronson,J.)(statingthat 
the debtor had it to trade and make profits from the sale of it; he treated the property as his 
own); see also Walker v. Snediker, 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (stating that debtor made 
sales of part of the goods rather than deliver them to the secured party). The pre-chattel 
mortgage act opinions enunciating the heightened rebuttable rule contained similar objections, 
see McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (Marcy, J.) (stating that the debtor 
not only had possession of the property, but used and disposed of it as the absolute owner); 
Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (Savage, CJ.) (prohibiting the debtor 
from selling any of the articles mortgaged and from appropriating the money to his own use). 
167. See White v. Cole, 24 Wend. 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (Cowen, J.) (noting that all 
judges have seen cases where the debtor denuded himself of leviable assets by granting a 
non possessory security interest to a friendly creditor and as a trial witness lied about the amount 
of the debt to protectthose assets); Smith v. Acker, 23 Wend. 653 (N.Y. 1840) (noting that New 
York legal history revealed a battle between a policy to cut off collusive sales and mortgages 
with a per se fraud rule and a policy to prevent hardship in individual cases with the rebuttable 
rule). 
168. See Butler v. VanWyck, 1 Hi11438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (Bronson, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that debtors use recorded chattel mortgages made with friends to defeat judgment 
liens while retaining use of their assets without paying legitimate creditors or the friendly 
creditor). 
169. The only one dealt with a defrauded supplier. See M'Intyre v. Scott, 8Johns. 159 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
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purchaser. 170 These three opinions treated traders lending to retailers, two 
opinions, or to a farmer, one opinion. 
So the problem transaction dealt with inventory as collateral and selling 
items from that inventory rather than defrauding judgment lienholders. The 
twelve opinions involving secured parties suing good faith purchasers to 
recover their property, or good faith purchasers suing secured parties for 
money, confirmed that this problem concerned the New York Justices. All of 
these opinions came from New York with four opinions; Maine with five 
opinions involving farmers after 1832; or from the West with three opinions 
after 1839.171 The absence of Massachusetts opinions suggests that 
Massachusetts judges had no problem with this type of transaction. 
The conceptual problem involved the form of the chattel mortgage in the 
1830's. As a sale subject to a defeasance condition, it would remain 
unsatisfied as long as the debtor continued to make his payments on the 
loan.172 For inventory serving as collateral, the debtor-seller had no ownership 
to transfer to a customer-buyer. All of the New York pre-chattel mortgage act 
opinions treating the good faith purchasers involved secured loans to a 
middleman-seller. A black and white rule enforcing the nonpossessory 
secured transaction would not eliminate the retailer's problem of purchasing 
from a trader's inventory with ownership in another, a note endorser lending 
secured to a trader. But the per se fraud rule would. So the group opposing 
the nonpossessory secured transaction became the retailer. 
The problem faced by the retailer developed in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century. During the Colonial Era, the predominate distribution 
network from the English seller to the American consumer only involved 
170. See Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (farmer-
debtor); Lewis v. Stevenson, 2 Hall 63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (trustee-secured); Barrow v. 
Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
171. For New York opinions, see Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) 
(debtor-sloop seller, a partnership, selling to a store owner, secured original owner and a store 
owner); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (debtor-oxen seller, 
a partnership selling to a corporation, secured the purchase money endorser); Lewis v. 
Stevenson, 2 Hall63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) (debtor-plate seller borrowed $5000 to pay import 
duties; secured a friend); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (debtor-furniture 
seller pays $425 annual rent, so probably a store operator; secured the landlord). For Maine 
opinions, see Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 (1838) (oxen); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) 
(horse); Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (oxen); Lunt v. Whitaker, 10 Me. 310 (1833) 
(livestock); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832) (chaise). For western opinions, see Morris v. 
Grover, 2 Ill. (l Scam.) 528 (1840); Hooben v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847); Hornbeck v. 
Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839). 
172. See LEONARD JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 527 (1881) (chattel mortgage involves no lien and has no equity of redemption like 
a mortgage on real estate, so ownership belongs with the mortgagor-lender). 
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predominantly one middleman, the American port merchant, who acted both 
as exporter-importer and retailer.173 But under the Colonial distribution 
system credit came from the English agent and ownership of the traded goods 
lay with the port merchant. As an exporter the port merchant purchased 
export goods with import goods, specie, or colonial paper. The port merchant 
shipped the export goods on consignment to an English agent, who sold the 
goods less a commission and purchased the import goods less a commission 
from the proceeds and arranged for shipment back to America to the port 
merchant. Typically the English purchases cost more than the English sales, 
so the English agent extended credit to the American port merchant. The 
credit extensions did not involve security, since purchases of American goods 
by the port merchant on behalf of the English agents, less a commission to 
repay the credit extension, later in America ordinarily offset the credit. The 
port merchant maintained a store to dispose of both his imports and items 
received in kind upon the sale of imports to his customers, both customers and 
back country retailers. Since customers needed credit for their purchases, the 
port merchants granted purchase loans over six months to one year at the legal 
maximum interest of six percent. These credit transactions also typically did 
not involve security interests since the port merchant seldom made vigorous 
efforts to collect on the numerous small debts. Consequently, ownership of 
the goods sold lay with the seller, for exports, the port merchant to the English 
agent and, for imports, the port merchant to the customer. 
But after 1815 the American distribution system began to reflect drastic 
changes. 174 A three-tiered system of wholesaler, jobber, both in the large 
cities, and retai!er in the small towns replaced the all-purpose port merchant. 
The American factory replaced some English agents, once American 
manufactures became competitive with English manufactures after the 1816 
tariff. 175 But under the Jacksonian distribution system credit came from the 
American wholesalers and jobbers, and the wholesalers frequently did not 
own the commodities handled, but acted as a conduit. Some former port 
merchants dropped retailing to become wholesalers, factors acting solely on 
consignments or commission merchants with some business in their own 
accounts. These wholesalers accepted only a few lines of goods either from 
a British exporter or a New England factory owner. They operated generally 
173. C. JOSEPH PUSATERI, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 49-52 (1984). 
174. See id. at 109-115; HERMAN KRoos & CHARlES GILBERT, AMERICAN BUSINESS 
HISTORY 129-31 (1972); CAROUNE F. WARE, THE EARLY NEW ENGLAND COTTON 
MANUFACTURE: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL BEGINNINGS 161-93 ( 1931 ). 
175. See DAUEU., supra note 31, at 36 (1816 tariffs passed to prevent English textile 
dumping). 
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on consignments since the volume became so large it exceeded the financial 
capacities of one firm. The jobber filled the gap between the wholesalers and 
the storekeepers. They purchased their own inventory from the wholesalers, 
sometimes on credit, and resold it as requested to local retailers. They offered 
credit terms up to one year, unavailable if the storekeeper had bought from the 
wholesaler. So the battle between those favoring and using security interests 
to protect their credit extensions to jobbers and those against security interests 
since they interfered with purchases from jobbers' inventory, also involved a 
geographical split between the large port, money centers and the rural back 
country. 
This development did not occur in all northern states equally. It 
predominated in the two northeastern states with connections to the west, New 
York by canal and Pennsylvania by turnpike and canal.176 New York came to 
dominate the import market due to its cotton factors' return cargos, its services 
as a center for British dumping, and its 1817 auction law insuring the lowest 
prices. 177 So the battle between these two interests would more likely occur 
in New York and Pennsylvania, rather than in Eastern New England. 
Following the lead of the manufacturers, the endorsers and wholesalers 
claiming a non possessory security interest in the jobbers' inventory attempted 
to restructure the transaction to conform with the law then current. They 
appointed the debtor-jobber as their agent to sell items from their collateral 
and replace it with other purchased items through the power to dispose and the 
after-acquired property clause. Unfortunately, just as for the manufacturers' 
attempt to evade the rebuttable rule through fixtures, these clauses failed to 
operate successfully. 178 American legal theory held that a debtor could not 
grant a security interest in property not yet owned at the time of making the 
176. CHARLES SEU.ERS, 'niE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-1846 
41-43 (1991). 
177. See id. at 41. 
178. New York rejected the power to dispose. See McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (brewery inventory); Divverv. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
l829)(retail grocery inventory). After the passage of the chattel mortgage statutes, the power 
to dispose would become acceptable in Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. See Abbott 
v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408 ( 1841) (country store inventory); Briggs v. Parkman, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 
258 (1841) (trader's inventory); Jenckes v. Goffe, l R.I. 511 (1851) (machine shop inventory). 
See also Melody v. Chandler, 12 Me. 282 (1835) (pre-chattel mortgage act for Maine). Yet the 
power to disposed continued to be unacceptable in New Hampshire and New York. See Putnam 
v. Osgood, 51 N.H. 192 (1871) (country store inventory); Ranlett v. Blodgett, 17 N.H. 298 
(1845) (carriage maker's inventory); Southard v. Benner, 72 N.Y. 424 (1878) (lumberyard 
inventory); Wood v. Lowry, 17 Wend. 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (dry goods inventory). 
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mortgage, the replacement collateral. 119 This result continued even after the 
adoption of the chattel mortgage acts. 180 
. N. THE ENGLISH DECISIONS 
The English opinion evidence suffered from many of the same 
drawbacks as the American opinion evidence. The facts involved atypical 
situations, not fitting well-settled rules. The facts remained obscured by the 
adversary system. But, unlike the American opinions, English opinions 
covered the entire period of interest. They commenced long before 1677. 
Unfortunately, collections of these opinions contained lacunae. England had 
no official reporting system until1788. 181 The private reporters only included 
opinions they deemed important. The opinions frequently referred to 
decisions found in no reporter. This article excluded most of these unreported 
opinions as too factually incomplete. 
179. See Letoumo v. Ringgold, 15 F. Cas. 409 (C.C.D. D.C. 1827) (No. 8,282) (chattel 
mortgage on stock of goods invalid against third party for goods purchased with proceeds after 
making the mortgage); Wagner v. Watts, 28 F. Cas. 1336 (C.C.D. D.C. 1819) (No. 17,040) 
(same); Bonsey v. Amee, 25 Mass. (9 Pick.) 236 (1829) (chattel mortgage for financing buyer 
on ship under construction void against third party). The one exception from the rule was for 
things potentially in existence at the time of mortgaging, such as crops from planted seed or 
wool from sheep owned. See Holly v. Brown, 14 Conn. 255 (1841) (replacement type attached 
to printing equipment covered); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 497 (1833) (clay to 
brick covered by chattel mortgage). 
180. See Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 86 (1842) (financing buyer of ship under 
construction), overruled on this point by Abbot v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408 (1841) (allowing a 
chattel mortgage on lime bought from proceeds of sale of collateral); Winslow v. Merchants' 
Ins. Co.,45 Mass. (4Met.) 306 (1842) (machine shop goods); Ranlett v. Blodgett, 17 N.H. 298 
(1845) (carriage maker's inventory); Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (scythes, 
iron, steel, and coal); accord Moody v. Wright, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 17 (1847) (tannery stock); 
Jones v. Richardson, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 481 (1845) (stock in trade); Pierce v. Emery, 32 N.H. 
484 ( 1856) (railroad bought cargo after mortgage not covered). The clause itself, however, did 
not invalidate the transaction. See Jones v. Huggeford, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 515 (1842) (valid for 
stock in trade on hand at execution); Briggs v. Parkman, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 258 ( 1841) (same). 
And Justice Joseph Story upheld the provision under the 1841 U.S. Bankruptcy Act, which 
recognized equitable as well as legal liens, claiming the after-acquired property clause created 
an equitable lien. See Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9,673) 
(cutlery stock in trade, based on Abbot v. Goodwin, supra); Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story 555 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (inventory purchased under letter of credit, based on Mitchell) . See also 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, c.9, § 2, 5 STAT. 440-41 (1841). 
181. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 424-34 (1788 for Common Pleas, 1789 for 
Chancery, and 1801 for the King's Bench). 
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The other major difference between American and English opinions 
involved the presence of bankruptcy statutes in England. 182 These statutes, 
applicable only to merchant debtors, provided an additional ground to find the 
nonpossessory secured transaction fraudulent. The bankruptcy laws sought 
rateable distribution of the debtors property amongst all creditors. English 
secured parties in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries held title to the 
collateral under a conditional deed or sale. If the court found the 
nonpossessory secured transaction valid, the collateral did not belong to the 
debtor and was not subject to rateable distribution. So the issue in many 
English opinions treated whether entry into the nonpossessory secured 
transaction amounted to an effort to avoid the bankruptcy statute's rateable 
distribution, a fraudulent transaction. Even so these opinions still revealed 
some information on the parties involved in the nonpossessory secured 
transaction and their practices. 
The British reports contained thirty-four appellate opinions in England 
dealing with the nonpossessory secured transaction prior to 1840.183 These 
opinions numbered so few in comparison with the American opinions since 
England had fewer appellate jurisdictions and since in the bankruptcy 
situation, typically before the Chancery, the courts used black and white rules 
applied by judges, the absolute-conditional rule and after 1749 the per se fraud 
rule. The English opinions seldom used the rebuttable rule until after 1800.184 
The rebuttable rule resulted in much of the American litigation. 185 
These opinions exhibited two major differences from the American 
opinions. First, the opinions did not exhibit emergent manufacturers before 
1835 or commoners, other than two farmers after 1815, as borrowers. 
Commercial merchants financed American manufacturers in New England. 186 
In contrast, English manufacturers financed themselves internally .187 
American common people achieved political power between the Revolution 
182. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 37-46, for a discussion of the 
applicable English bankruptcy statutes, the major opinions decided under them, and the reason 
for their absence in America. 
183. This numbering does not include assignment for benefit of creditors, genuine 
bottomry and respondentia bond, or pledge opinions. As in the case of northern states with late 
chattel mortgage acts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, this article only considers the English 
opinions before 1840. 
184. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for the absolute-conditional rule, the per 
se fraud rule, and the rebuttable rule. 
185. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
187. 6 H.J. HABBAKKUH & M. POTEON, EDS., THE CAMBRIDGE EcONOMIC HISTORY OF 
EUROPE 297-98 (1965) (British merchants used accumulated capital to bring workers under one 
roof). 
2000] SECURED TRANSACTIONS HISTORY 59 
and the Jacksonian Era in most states. 188 Legislatures supported by their votes 
provided banks with charter provisions requiring them to lend to certain 
classes, such as farmers and mechanics. 189 In contrast, the English common 
people did not begin to gain political power until the Reform Bill of 1832.190 
The absence of manufacturers and commoners meant most decisions 
involved commercial merchants. The bankruptcy laws applied only to this 
class. 191 The opinions reflected this fact. Eighteen English opinions (53%) 
involved bankruptcy law challenges to the non possessory secured transaction, 
where the concern did not involve priority but an effort to protect rateable 
distribution. 192 
A. PARTIES AND STRUCTURE 
The British opinions described the debtor in thirty-one opinions (91 %). 
Traders and ship-owners dominated appearing in sixteen opinions. 193 Other 
opinions involved five brewers and distillers, three retail establishments, two 
188. See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 131, at 10 (Regency and Anti-Regency parties used 
tactic of appealing to the masses to win elections by 1824 in New York). 
189. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 32, at 145-46 (Republican support of banks meant 
business opportunities not limited to aristocrats, but includes new entrepreneurs; Republican 
legislators awarded bank charters to their supporters, brealdng Federalist banking monopolies); 
id. at 49 (Burr's bank); id. at 164 (Gallatin's bank). 
190. See, e.g., COLINRHYS LoVEI..L, ENGUSH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY: A 
SURVEY 469-77 (1962). 
191. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 37-46. 
192. See Carr v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1835); Robinson v. M' Donnell, 106 
Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1818); Mair v. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815); Hom v. Baker, 
103 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1808); Manton v. Moore, 101 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796); Ex Parte 
Batson, 29 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1791); Lempriere v. Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788); 
Atkinson v. Maling, 100 Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788); Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694 (K.B. 
1784); Hassells v. Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n (K.B. 1781); Law v. Skinner, 96 Eng. Rep. 585 
(C.P. 1775); Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1759); Worseley v. Demattos, 97 Eng. 
Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758); Ex parte Mathews, 28 Eng. Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751); Ryall v. Rolle, 26Eng. 
Rep. 107 (Ch. 1749); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1749); Brown v. Heathcote, 26 
Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1746); Bourne v. Dodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740). 
193. For shipowners, see Robinson v. M'Donnell,106Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1818); Mair 
v. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815); Ex parte Batson, 29 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1791); 
Lempriere v. Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788); Atkinson v. Maling, 100 Eng. Rep. 249 
(K.B. 1788); Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694 (K.B. 1784); Ex parte Matthews, 28 Eng. Rep. 
176 (Ch. 1751); Sansum v. Braggington, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750); Buxton v. Snee, 27 
Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1748); Brown v. Heathcote, 26 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1746); Bourne v. 
Dodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (1740). See also Carr v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1835) 
(shipowner and soap manufacturer). For traders, see Reed v. Wilmont, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 
1831); Jones v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 679 (Ch. 1794), rev'd, 30 Eng. Rep. 683 (H.L. 1798); 
Hassells v. Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n (K.B. 1781); Bucknal v. Roiston, 24Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 
1704); Cole v. Davies, 91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1697). 
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manufacturers, two farmers, a note dealer, a captain, and a construction 
engineer. 194 An examination of the collateral related in thirty-three opinions 
(97%) revealed the same. Most opinions involved trade goods and ships. 195 
Other opinions treated equipment, business furniture, farm produce, brazil 
wood, company stock, and construction materials. 196 
But the opinions did not identify many secured parties and general 
creditors. Secured parties, identified in sixteen opinions ( 41% ), included three 
merchants, three bankers, three relatives, two ship suppliers, two brewer 
partners, a shipowner, a landlord, and a canal company.197 The bankruptcy 
' 
194. For brewers and distillers, see Horn v. Baker, 103 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1808) 
(distiller); Steel v. Brown, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808); Worseley v. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 
407 (K.B. 1758); Ryall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ch. 1749); Westv. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 
(Ch. 1749). Forthe retailers, see Martindale v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. l832)(tavern 
keeper); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800) (public house operator); Meggot 
v. Mills, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697) (inn keeper). For manufacturers, see Minshall v. 
Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ex. 1837) (colliery operator); Carr v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 
(Ex. 1835) (soap manufacturer). For farmers, see Jezeph v. Ingram, 129 Eng. Rep. 609 (C.P. 
1817); Benton v. Thornhill, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816). For the engineer, see Manton v. 
Moore, 101 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796). For the note dealer, see Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 
583 (K.B. 1759). For the ship captain, see Reeves v. Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838). 
195. For trade goods see Carr v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1834); Steel v. 
Brown, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800); 
Edwards v. Harben, 100 Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B. 1788); Hassells v. Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n 
(K.B . 1779); Law v. Skinner, 96 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1775); Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 
(K.B. 1759); Worseley v. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758); Ryall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 
107 (Ch. 1749); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1749); Brown v. Heathcote, 26 Eng. 
Rep. 103 (Ch. 1746); Bucknal v. Roiston, 24Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. l709); Colev. Davies, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1697). For ships, see, e.g., Reed v. Wilmont, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 1831); 
Robinson v. M'Donnell, 106 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1818); Mair v. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 
(K.B. 1815); Ex parte Batson, 29 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1791); Atkinson v. Mating, l 00 Eng. Rep. 
249 (K.B. 1788); Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694 (K.B. 1784); Ex parte Matthews, 28 Eng. 
Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751 ); Sansum v. Braggington, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750); Buxton v. Snee, 
27 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1748); Bourne v. Dodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740). 
196. For equipment, see, e.g., Reeves v. Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838) 
(chronometer); Minshall v. Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ex. 1837) (steam engines); Horn v. 
Baker, l 03 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1808) (still, vats). For business furniture, see, e.g., Martindale 
v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832); Meggot v. Mills, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697). 
For farm produce, see, e.g., Jezeph v. Ingram, 129 Eng. Rep. 609 (C.P. 1817); Benton v. 
Thornhill, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816). For brazil wood, see Lempriere v. Pasley, 100 Eng. 
Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788). For stock shares, see Jones v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 679 (Ch. 1794), 
rev'd, 30 Eng. Rep. 683 (H.L. 1798). For construction materials, see Manton v. Moore, 101 
Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796). 
197. For merchants, see, e.g., Martindale v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832); Mair 
v. Glennie, l05 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815); Ex parte Batson, 29Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch.l79l). For 
the bankers, see, e.g., Carrv. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1834); Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. 
Rep. 694 (K.B. 1784); Worseley v. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758). For the relatives, 
see, e.g., Minshall v . Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ex. 1837) (mother); Benton v. Thornhill, 129 
Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816)(brother-in-law); Kidd v. Rawlinson, l26Eng. Rep. ll55 (C.P. 1800). 
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and estate administration situations, both involving stand-ins for general 
creditors, hid the identity of general creditors identified in five opinions 
(17%). Sixteen opinions dealt with bankruptcy assignees, executors, and 
unidentified judgment lienholders. 198 The identified general creditors included 
a banker, a lawyer, a purchaser, a brewer, and the debtor's sisters.199 
As in America, parties created most nonpossessory secured transactions 
by chattel mortgages, appearing in nineteen opinions (56%) or bills of sale, 
appearing in eleven opinions (32% ).200 One opinion dealt with an assignment 
For ship suppliers, see, e.g., Sansum v. Braggington, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750); Buxton v. 
Snee, 27 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1748). For brewers, see, e.g., Ryall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107 
(Ch. 1749); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1749). For the shipowner, see Reeves v. 
Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838) (chronometer). For the landlord, see Meggot v. Mills, 
91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697). For the canal company, ~ee Manton v. Moore, 101 Eng. Rep. 
858 (K.B. 1796). 
198. For bankruptcy trustees, see, e.g., Carr v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1834); 
Reed v. Wilmot, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 1831); Robinson v. M'Donnell, 106 Eng. Rep. 316 
(K.B. 1818); Mair v. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815); Hom v. Baker, 103 Eng. Rep. 
555 (K.B. 1808); Manton v. Moore, 101 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796); Ex parte Batson, 29 Eng. 
Rep. 584(Ch. 1791); Lemprierev. Pasley, 100Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788); Atkinson v. Mating, 
100 Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788); Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694 (K.B. 1784); Hassells v. 
Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n (K.B. 1779); Law v. Skinner, 96 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1775); 
Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1759); Worseley v. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 
1758); Ryall v. Rolle, 26Eng. Rep.107 (Ch.l749); Brown v. Heathcote, 26Eng. Rep. l03 (Ch. 
1746); Bourne v. Dodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740). For estate executors, see, e.g., 
Edwards v. Harben,100Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B.1788); Bucknal v. Roiston, 24Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 
1709). For judgment lienholders, see, e.g. , Martindale v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 
1832); Benton v. Thornhill, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816); Jones v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 697 
(Ch. 1794), rev 'd, 30 Eng. Rep. 683 (H.L. 1798); Bamford v. Baron, 100 Eng. Rep. 319 n(a) 
(K.B. 1788); Cole v. Davies, 91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1697). 
199. See Reeves v. Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838) (attorney for unspecified 
client); Minshall v. Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ex. 1837) (bank partnership); Kidd v. 
Rawlinson, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800) (purchaser); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 
1749) (sisters); Meggot v. Mills, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697) (brewer). 
200. For mortgages, see, e.g., Minshall v. Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ex. 1837); Carr v. 
Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1834); Reed v. Wilmot, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 1831); 
Jezeph v. Ingram, 129 Eng. Rep. 609 (C.P. 1817); Hom v. Baker, 103 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 
1808); Jones v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 697 (Ch. 1794), rev'd, 30 Eng. Rep. 683 (H.L. 1798); Ex 
parte Batson, 29 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1791); Bamford v. Baron, 100 Eng. Rep. 319 n(a) (K.B. 
1788); Atkinson v. Maling, IOO Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788); Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694 
(K.B. 1784); Hassells v. Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n (K.B. 1779); Law v. Skinner, 96 Eng. Rep. 
585 (K.B. 1775); Worseleyv. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758); Ex parte Matthews, 28 
Eng. Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751); Sansum v. Braggington, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750); Ryall v. 
Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ch. 1749); Buxton v. Snee, 27 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1748); Brown v. 
Heathcote, 26Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch.l746); Bourne v. Dodson, 26Eng. Rep. IOO (Ch. 1740). For 
bills of sale, see, e.g., Martindale v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832); Robinson v. 
M' Donnell, 106 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1818); Benton v. Thornhill, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 
1816); Mair v. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815); Steel v. Brown, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 
(C.P. 1808); Kidd v. Rawlinson,l26 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800); Manton v. Moore, 101 Eng. 
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and two with a written instrument.201 Since parties drafted some title 
documents in absolute form, fifteen opinions ( 44%) described the 
supplemental documentation. Unlike America, this additional documentation 
usually involved other types of documents, such as: oral agreements, deeds of 
surrender of copyhold, warrants of attorney, bills of lading, and insurance 
policies, as well as bottomry bonds, bills of sale, and defeasance deeds.202 
And unlike America, most transactions occurred concurrently with the 
lending, fifteen opinions, (44%) or after the lending, fourteen opinions 
(41 %).203 
The British practice resembled the American practice. The secured party 
took the nonpossessory secured transaction when feeling insecure. The 
British courts regarded this as significant in the early opinions. They upheld 
Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796);Edwards v. Harben,100Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B.1788); Bucknal v. Roiston, 
24Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 1709); Cole v. Davies, 91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1697); Meggot v. Mills, 
91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697). 
201. For assignments, see Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1759). For written 
instruments, see, e.g., Reeves v. Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838); Lempriere v. Pasley, 
100 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788). 
202. For oral agreements, see, e.g., Robinson v. M'Donnell, 106 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 
1818); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800); Bamford v. Baron, 100 Eng. Rep. 
319n(a) (K.B. 1788); Colev. Davies, 91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1697); Meggotv. Mills, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697). For bills oflading,see, e.g., Mairv. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 
1815); Lempriere v. Pasley,100Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788); Brown v. Heathcote, 26Eng. Rep. 
I 03 (Ch. 1746). For bottomry bonds, see Bucknal v. Roiston, 24 Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 1709). 
For a defeasance bond, see Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1759). For warranty of 
attorney, see Manton v. Moore, 101 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796). For bills of sale, see Atkinson 
v. Maling, 100 Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788); Ex parte Matthews, 28 Eng. Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751). 
For a deed of surrender, see Reed v. Wilmot, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 1831). For insurance 
policies, see Ex parte Batson, 29 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1791). 
203. For current loans, see, e.g., Reeves v. Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838); 
Horn v. Baker, 103 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1808); Jones v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 697 (Ch. 1794), 
rev'd, 30 Eng. Rep. 683 (H.L. 1798); Steel v. Brown, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808); Hall v. 
Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694 (K.B. 1784); Hassells v. Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n (K.B. 1779); 
Law v. Skinner, 96 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1775); Sansum v. Braggington, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 
1750); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1749); Ryall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ch. 
1749); Buxton v. Snee, 27 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1748); Brown v. Heathcote, 26 Eng. Rep. 103 
(Ch. 1746); Bucknal v. Roiston, 24 Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 1709); Cole v. Davies, 91 Eng. Rep. 
1383 (K.B. 1697); Meggot v. Mills, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697). For prior loans, see Carr 
v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1834); Reed v. Wilmot, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 1831); 
Robinson v. M'Donnell, 106 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1818); Jezeph v. Ingram,l29 Eng. Rep. 609 
(C.P. 1817); Benton v. Thornhill, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816); Mair v. Glennie, 105 Eng. 
Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815); Ex parte Matthews, 28 Eng. Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751); Lempriere v. Pasley, 
100 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800); Manton 
v. Moore,101 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796); Edwards v. Harben,100Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B. 1788); 
Atkinson v. Maling, 100 Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788); Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 
1759); Bourne v. Dodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740). For future loans, see Martindale v. 
Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832); Worseley v. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758). 
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those transactions that lacked this aspect in 1709 and in 1746 and specifically 
denigrating those that contained it.204 
B. LITIGATION 
Litigation, despite the overwhelming bankruptcy situation, resembled 
American litigation. Only thirty-two opinions involved third party challenges 
to the nonpossessory secured transaction. Trespass and trover actions, 
fourteen opinions (47%), even within bankruptcy proceedings, appeared 
frequently.205 But the English also used assumpsit actions in six opinions 
(19%) to recover monies for wrongful takings.206 The remaining actions 
involved accounting, bankruptcy, or remained unspecified.207 
As in American litigation, there was a discontinuity in results. But rather 
than a geographical one, it involved time. The secured party won in all the 
opinions, both in bankruptcy and out of bankruptcy, before 17 49. But after 
17 49 the secured party only won in seventy-two percent of the non-bankruptcy 
204. See Brown v. Heathcote, 26 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1746) (showing that the common 
cases are where the creditor pretends to set up a demand for an old debt for a debtor in declining 
circumstances to obtain a preference by an assignment of the goods); Bucknal v. Roiston, 24 
Eng. Rep. 136, sub nom. Anon., 22 Eng. Rep. 407 (Ch. 1709) (keeping possession was not to 
give a false credit, as in other cases). 
205. For trespass actions, see Martindale v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832) 
(won); Wilson v. Day, 97 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1759) (lost; bankruptcy). For trover actions, see 
Reeves v. Capper, 132 Eng. Rep. 1057 (C.P. 1838) (won); Minshall v. Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 
834 (Ex. 1837) (lost); Carr v. Burdiss, 149 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ex. 1834) (won; bankruptcy); 
Robinson v. M'Donnell, 106 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1818) (won; bankruptcy); Benton v. 
Thornhill, 129Eng. Rep. 60(C.P. 1816)(won); Steel v. Brown, 127Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808) 
(won); Hom v. Baker, 103 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1808) (lost; bankruptcy); Lempriere v. Pasley, 
I 00 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788) (won; bankruptcy); Bamford v. Baron, 100 Eng. Rep. 319 n(a) 
(K.B. 1788) (lost); Atkinson v. Maling,100Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788) (won; bankruptcy); Cole 
v. Davies, 91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1697) (won); Meggot v. Mills, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 
1697) (won). The parentheticals show whether the secured won or lost. See infra note 208 and 
accompanying text for the analysis of this matter. 
206. For assumpsit actions, see Reed v. Wilmot, 131 Eng. Rep. 223 (C.P. 1831) (won); 
Mair v. Glennie, 105 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1815) (lost; bankruptcy); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 126 
Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1800) (won); Edwards v. Harben, 100 Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B. 1788) (lost); 
Hall v. Gurney, 99 Eng. Rep. 694(K.B. 1784) (lost; bankruptcy); Lawv. Skinner, 96Eng. Rep. 
585 (K.B. 1775) (lost; bankruptcy). 
207. For accounting actions, see Jones v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 697 (Ch. 1794) (won), 
rev'd, 30 Eng. Rep. 683 (H.L. 1798); Bucknal v. Roiston, 24Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 1709) (won). 
For bankruptcy challenges, see Ex parte Batson, 29 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1791) (won); Worseley 
v. Demattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1758) (lost); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1749) 
(won); Ryall v. Rolle, 26 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ch. 1749) (lost); Brown v. Heathcote, 26 Eng. Rep. 
103 (Ch. 1746)(won); Bourne v. Dodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740)(won). For unspecified 
actions, see Jezeph v. Ingram, 129 Eng. Rep. 609 (C.P. 1817) (won); Manton v. Moore, 101 
Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796) (won; bankruptcy); Hassells v. Simpson, 99 Eng. Rep. 60n (K.B. 
1779) (lost; bankruptcy); Ex parte Matthews, 28 Eng. Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751) (won; bankruptcy). 
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opinions and won only fifty percent of the bankruptcy opinions.208 Ostensibly, 
the courts suddenly realized in 17 49 that the reputed ownership clause devised 
in 1624 voided the nonpossessory secured transaction. Prior to 1749 the 
courts applied fraudulent conveyance law even in the bankruptcy situation. 
Under the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Act the test of validity only involved 
the honesty of the transaction. 
Although not evident from the English opinions, the reason for the shift 
against the nonposessory secured transaction mirrored the situation in 
America. The distribution system had developed sufficiently to bifurcate 
between wholesalers and retailers.209 
So the English opinions confirm two facts readily apparent from the 
American opinions. First, the nonpossessory secured transaction developed 
as a mechanism to defeat judgment liens.21° Consequently, secured parties 
tended to enter the transaction when a potential judgment lienholder 
.reatened the debtor with lawsuit. Since the secured party obtained the 
onpossessory secured transaction after lending, frequently, the 
Jocumentation did not accurately reflect the transaction and required 
supplementation to establish it. 
Second, there developed a group of people, the retailers, who opposed 
the use of the nonpossessory secured transaction as interfering with the 
availability to sell inventory in an era before the good faith purchaser doctrine. 
This group developed earlier in England than in America due to the mercantile 
system relegating America as a source of raw materials and ultimate 
consumers. But England differed from America in that England possessed an 
old bankruptcy statute that could provide the retailers with the per se fraud 
rule they desired. And the manufacturing group that would favor the 
nonpossessory secured transaction for purchase money sales of equipment 
lacked political power at the critical junction in 1750. When the 
manufacturers finally appeared in the opinions, they attempted the same 
techniques used by their American counterparts, namely fixture law. But they 
fared no better than their American counterparts.211 
208. See supra notes 205-07. 
209. See PHYllis DEANE, THE FIRsTINDUSTRIALREVOUITION 256-59 (1965) (beginning 
to appear before the end of the eighteenth century). 
210. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 21-23 nn.86-89 (use of warrants of 
attorney to mimic the collusive judgment). 
211. See Minshall v. Lloyd, 150 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ex. 1837). 
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CONCLUSION 
The nonpossessory secured transaction evolved after 1677 as a 
competitor to the previously effective collusive judgment. The collusive 
judgment originally possessed two advantages: priority and speedy levy. 
Parties generally created the collusive judgment at the time of lending. But 
the 1677 Statute of Frauds destroyed the priority of the collusive judgment and 
statutes limited speedy levy to small transactions.212 
These conditions enabled a change in the lending practices in the non-
collusive judgment market. In the early seventeenth century this market lent 
on the basis of the debtor's reputation or a substantial friendly guarantor and 
pledged personalty. When banks formed in late seventeenth century England 
and late eighteenth century America, they also lent on the basis of reputation 
and pledged personalty.213 Before 1677 these guarantor lenders had little 
chance of defeating the priority of a collusive judgment, so they lent 
unsecured as co-debtors. But the 1677 Statute of Frauds opened the 
possibility of defeating the priority of a collusive judgment. The substantial 
guarantors gradually learned to enter into a non possessory secured transaction 
with their debtor friends. Debtors reserved pledges for bank loans, leaving the 
nonpossessory secured transaction for the guarantors. These transactions first 
appeared among shippers as they were the only ones with sufficient investable 
funds. Later when shippers got into manufacturing, they began to use the 
nonpossessory secured transaction in this industry, frequently for purchase 
money loans. The common masses also adopted the technique when their 
political power became sufficient to demand bank loans. 
Parties used the Anglo-American nonpossessory secured transaction to 
defeat the judgment lienholder. In the eighteenth century, the secured party 
usually was a guarantor, for a bank or inventory supplier, or an equipment 
seller. But guarantors, new to taking security, generally did not acquire their 
security interest at the time of making the loan, as did the user of the collusive 
judgment. Instead they hastily obtained it from friendly debtors when they felt 
· insecure, before the debtor became subject to a judicial lien or became 
insolvent. Consequently, their documentation frequently did not describe the 
transaction completely. Under the rebuttable rule, courts would accept 
supplementary documentation and allow a jury to decide the validity of the 
nonpossessory secured transaction. Sometimes juries would find valid 
212. See Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 9, at 23 n.9l. 
213. HABBAKKUH & POTEON, supra note 187, at 353 (showing that eighteenth century 
London bankers lent on personal bonds). 
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transactions fraudulent, sometimes they would find fraudulent transactions 
valid. 
But the nonpossessory secured transaction of that era adhered to the 
single-owner theory. The nonpossessory secured transaction constituted a sale 
of the collateral from the debtor to the secured party, even though the debtor 
retained possession. This worked fine for those owning the goods and selling 
to the ultimate consumer, the port merchant in eighteenth century America. 
But when the distribution system bifurcated wholesalers and retailers, retailers 
who bought on credit suffered problems if they granted the wholesaler or 
some guarantor a nonpossessory secured transaction in their inventory. They 
did not have title to transfer to the ultimate customer. So after 1815 a tension 
grew between credit equipment sellers, who desired nonpossessory secured 
transactions to protect their sale, and retailers, who desired the freedom to sell 
to consumer buyers. 
The rebuttable rule could not handle this new situation. Under the 
rebuttable rule enterprising parties could force legitimate nonpossessory 
secured transactions to risk a jury determination of invalidity, or encourage a 
jury to find a fraudulent nonpossessory secured transaction valid. Jury 
determination led certain groups to agitate for different priority rules. 
Commercial merchants, weak on documentation, defended the rebuttable rule. 
But equipment manufacturers and financial institutions, accurate in 
documentation, preferred a rule upholding the nonpossessory secured 
transaction without jury trial. Retailers, concerned about sales from 
encumbered inventory, desired to abolish the transaction, at least as it applied 
to inventory. 
One could envision the following development. The chattel mortgage 
acts of the nineteenth century provided protection to the enterprise lenders at 
the expense of service providers and customers. Legislatures later authorized 
short lived statutory supplier liens to provide protection for certain service 
providers, at the expense of the secured creditors.214 Similarly, the doctrine 
of the good faith purchaser, developed later in the same century,21S provided 
214. The laborers eventually obtained statutory liens advocated by their Workingmen's 
Parties in the early 1830's when adopted by the other major political parties. See, e.g., DIXON 
RYAN FOX, THE DECUNE OF ARisTOCRACY IN THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK 352-59 {1919) 
(demonstrating that in New York the Working Man • s Party formed 1829 and disappeared when 
Anti-Masons and Tammany Hall advocate their program). 
215. See GilMORE, supra note 6, at 39-47,677-79. The states had various techniques. 
Some states banned chattel mortgages on stock in trade by statute. See JONES, supra note 172, 
at 345-47 (Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Vermont among others). Other states banned chattel 
mortgages on stock in trade by case law. /d. at 348 (Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin among others). While still other states left the 
fraud issue to the jury. See Annotation, Validity of Chattel Mortgage Where Mortgagor is 
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protection for certain buyers at the expense of the enterprise, which could no 
longer borrow on the basis of inventory. In the twentieth century tort victims 
have become judgment lienholders. They now seek protection. But rather 
than seek total recovery, provided they satisfy certain conditions, they seek 
percentage ratability with the secured creditors. Their judgments far exceed 
the assets of the business, not having contributed value directly to the 
enterprise, unlike supplier and customer judgment lienholders of the past. 
Given Right to Sell, 13 A.L.R. 236 (1931) (Iowa, Michigan, and New Jersey among others). 
Finally, other states found a waiver of the mortgage in permitting the debtor to sell. See W.W. 
Allen, Annotation, Chattel Mortgagee 's Consent to Sale of Mortgaged Property as Waiver of 
Lien, 91 A.L.R. 646 (1935) (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island among others). 
